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Moral philosophy has become interested again in particular, substantive questions of right and 
wrong.  In an effort to divine answers to such questions, philosophers often employ the following 
method: general rules are floated as potential principles of morality; the principles are regarded 
as confirmed insofar as they match our pre-theoretical intuitions about particular cases; and 
otherwise infirmed.  Such principles, if sufficiently confirmed, are then used to overturn other, 
‘aberrant’ moral intuitions that do not square with the rule.   
 The aim of this work is to indict this ‘method of moral hypothesis’, and with it the moral 
theory project which relies on it.  I argue that the method trades on an unsustainable picture of 
moral epistemology; that the motivations for engaging in it are without merit; and that its 
attractions as a systematizing tool are illusory. 
 In chapter one, I examine some recent ‘etiological’ skeptical challenges to moral 
knowledge; and argue that such challenges succeed only against a particular sort of moral 
epistemology—the kind to which the moral theory project is wedded.  I conclude that we should 
reject this epistemology, and the project with it. 
 Chapter two aims to vindicate the charges of Pessimists about moral testimony—those 
who claim that testimony cannot transmit moral knowledge.  I argue that one barrier to moral-
knowledge transmission by testimony is its inability to transfer moral-conceptual ‘know-how’; 
more generally that the ‘Humean reasons’ which support testimony are insufficient to support 
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moral knowledge; and that, for parallel reasons, the theory project cannot produce moral 
knowledge.  
 Chapter three attacks a picture of justification which makes the theory project seem 
pressing.  In its place, I argue for an alternative picture, on which justification is infected with 
certain pragmatic, contextual factors.  This alternative undermines one of the motivations for the 
theory project: finding an ultimate justification for our moral beliefs. 
 In chapter four, I unify these arguments; and argue that, in general, we are correct to 
reject any summarizing principle which conflicts with a strongly held, pre-theoretical moral 
verdict.  This negates one of the central ambitions of the theory project.  Its other motivations 
are, I argue, equally misplaced. 
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INTRODUCTION 
My task in the following four essays is to try cast some suspicion on the project that has 
sometimes been called ‘moral theory’: the project of trying to bring our various spontaneous 
moral judgments into some systematic, unified whole, typically, by bringing individual 
judgments under principles, and then those principles under more general principles still; and in 
particular the version of this project in which it is accepted that some of our spontaneous moral 
judgments will have to go, under pressure from the systematizing requirement.  We find this 
project going on, from one end, in theorists who begin by deploying some very general formula, 
a kind of master principle of morality, and try to work their way down to particular judgments; 
these theorists are generally acknowledged to be engaged in ‘moral theory’. But the term—
‘moral theorizing’—could be applied with equal justice to those theorists who work from the 
other end: who begin with some set of spontaneous moral verdicts (‘moral intuitions’) about 
ostensibly similar cases, and try to develop some principle which will divide the cases according 
to our intuitions.  What is again vital, for my point, is the willingness of these theorists to 
abandon some recalcitrant ‘intuition’ if it fails to fit the general pattern.  Of course, the offending 
intuition is not merely abandoned; some attempt is always made to ‘account’ for it.  But, as I 
shall argue, there remains something problematic here nonetheless.  My aim, in what follows, 
will be to suggest some grounds for Annette Baier’s suspicion of “the whole idea of a moral 
‘theory’ which systematizes and extends a body of moral judgments, and […] in particular the 
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idea that a theorist might accept a theory with controversial implications, without thereby 
becoming a moral reformer, one dedicated to having these implications endorsed and acted 
upon.” 
* * * 
Although, in the course of these essays, I give various arguments against the theory 
project, the thread which connects the various arguments is the claim that that project relies on a 
doubtful, quasi-empirical epistemology.  We can begin to get a picture of that epistemology in 
the following way. 
When philosophers want to assert something about objectivity, we sometimes find them 
falling back on such phrases as ‘out there’ (“the facts are out there, independent of us”) or ‘there 
anyway’ (“responding to what is there anyway”).  The demonstrative is in one way unfortunate, 
since it seems to place these facts somewhere in space.  But although in a way also misleading, 
this manner of speaking actually suggests itself in the empirical case: the facts about the stars are 
‘out there’ in the sense that the stars are out there, somewhere in space. (The tendency to 
conflate the facts and the objects that those facts are about, is not itself entirely innocent.) This 
manner of speaking is conducive, moreover, to a certain picture of how we come to know the 
facts—roughly, we are in causal contact with them. (But see the parenthetical remark; 
philosophers sometimes write this way, though it seems clear enough that light does not bounce 
off the facts.) 
Whatever the merits or demerits of this way of speaking in the empirical realm, it can 
only engender confusion, I think, when speaking of ethics.  Of course we want to insist that we 
don’t get to “make up the facts”; that the facts about what we ought to do, do not depend entirely 
on (e.g.) what we happen to want (though of course some philosophers have, with sedulous 
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consistency, drawn this conclusion)—in a word, that the facts are ‘objective’ or ‘real’.  On the 
other hand, the language suggests again a causal relation to the facts; and here, in ethics, the idea 
is surely absurd.  It might now look as though the ethical facts—that is, the facts about what we 
ought to do—could have remained—could remain even now—forever hidden from human 
beings, by chance or by their nature beyond our ken.   
That there is an essential disanalogy—in point of “out there-ness,” as we might put it—
between the facts of empirical nature and the facts of ethics is shown, I think, by very different 
ways in which we justify these facts, and query claims about them.  The point can be summed up 
by saying that, if I want to query some empirical claim of yours—“She is in the library”—I shall 
ask, “How do you know?”; whereas if I want to query a moral claim—“Abortion is wrong”—I 
shall ask “Why?”, and never “How do you know?” Likewise, to justify some empirical claim, I 
shall, typically, advert either to a) the mode of apprehension—“I saw her,” “I heard her”—or else 
b) evidence; whereas to justify an ethical claim I shall give reasons. 
What is the difference between ‘evidence’ and ‘reasons’, as I am using those terms? One 
way to put it might be this: if x, y, and z are reasons, then they are reasons why P is true.  And if 
I come to see that P is true by being given the reasons for P, then I see that P is true in virtue of 
the reasons.  Nothing like this could be said of evidence.  If x, y, and z are evidence for P, then 
they are not reasons why P is true but grounds for believing P.  And if I come to believe P on the 
basis of x, y, and z, I still do not see that P is true in virtue of x, y, and z. 
This may seem a very fine distinction indeed, but it is robust, I think, when we look at 
cases.  If I say that there is a raccoon in the house, and you query that claim, I might advert to the 
little (disgusting) paw-prints and the overturned garbage can.  I believe, then, that there is a 
raccoon in the house—as you might come to believe it—on the basis of various bit of evidence; 
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but of course that there are tiny paw-prints couldn’t be said to be the ‘reason why’ there is a 
raccoon in the house.  Whereas, on the other hand, if I say that it would be wrong to tell Jones 
that story, and I justify that claim by noting that it would hurt her feelings, then that it would hurt 
her feelings is precisely the reason why it would be wrong to tell her. 
The point is not limited to ethics.  In many places we give the reasons why something is 
so, as opposed to ‘reasons to believe’: we might say why a joke is funny; why a book is a good 
book; or why we should go to the party tonight.  Any claim made in these areas—humor, 
aesthetics, prudence—is queried by asking “Why?” and never “How do you know?” For this 
reason, it would be equally absurd to ask for evidence that a joke was funny, or that a book was 
good, and so on.   
All this is connected with the language of “out there-ness” in the following way.  When 
we justify an empirical claim, we make reference, in one way or another, to the source of our 
knowledge.  For in referencing a mode of apprehension (sight, hearing), we give our interlocutor 
to understand how there might be a path, as we could put it, between ourselves and what our 
belief is about.  In short, we make room for a causal story—in the broadest sense of that term—
about how we could have acquired our knowledge.  And when we give evidence we do 
something similar.  When we cite evidence—paw-prints, strewn garbage—we offer our claim 
(“There is a raccoon in here”) as the best explanation for these various items.  That is: we justify 
our major claim by making room for a causal story, that runs from (say) the raccoon, through 
paw-prints, to ourselves.  So there is a recognizable sense, in either case, in which the facts are 
‘out there’, and then discovered by us, either by direct apprehension, or as mediated by various 
bits of evidence. 
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Whereas the ethical facts—if there are any—are not anywhere in space; and so to justify 
claims about them will never make reference to their source—not to a mode of apprehension nor 
to evidence for those claims.  What we do give are reasons—that is, reasons why they are so.     
–Just as we give reasons why a joke is funny, reasons why a book is good, and reasons that we 
should go to the party.   
* * *  
What I argue, in the following pages, is that the ‘main method’ of ethics, as I have 
described it, depends crucially on treating various moral beliefs—and specifically what are often 
called our ‘moral intuitions’—as bits of evidence—in effect, a quasi-empirical model of ethics.   
In Chapter 1 I argue that this model for moral epistemology opens the door for fatal 
skeptical problems, and for that reason, should be abandoned.  By treating the relationship 
between ethical grounds and conclusions as evidential, the (manifest) facts about the contingent 
origins of our beliefs will rush in to undermine our claims to moral knowledge.  In effect, we 
hold our ethical beliefs hostage to an inference to the best explanation—an inference which will 
always be fatal, since the idea of causal contact with the ethical facts is a non-starter. 
Chapter 2 approaches the problem from a different angle; it comprises some reflections 
on moral testimony.  In this chapter my aim is to substantiate the charge, argued by many 
theorists, that there is something specially problematic about the idea of moral knowledge being 
transmitted by testimony.  My thought is that one reason moral knowledge cannot be so 
transmitted is that such knowledge is, in part, a kind of ‘know-how’—conceptual know-how—
which, by its nature, will not be conveyed by anything properly called ‘testimony’—not even if 
that testimony includes also the grounds for the major claim.  But the larger point is that the 
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various barriers to knowledge-transmission by testimony have parallels in the methods of moral 
theorizing: it is equally unequipped to deliver moral knowledge. 
Chapter 3 is a departure.  One reason that philosophers have felt the need for a moral 
theory has been their sense that moral claims must be justified by further—often: broader, more 
general—moral claims; and these in turn by further, more general principles still.  The result is 
the pyramidal structure of moral theory, familiar from Kant and Mill, but also more 
contemporary theorists—Scanlon or Parfit.  My point in this chapter is to undermine the picture 
of justification which supports this felt need; and thereby to remove one of the major incentives 
for ambitious moral theorizing. 
In the final chapter, I tie these themes together, and apply their lessons to the ‘main 
method’.  I conclude that there is something very doubtful about the project’s central ambition: 
revising and extending our considered moral judgments about particular, local cases; and I give 
some grounds for skepticism for other motivations for the project. 
 
 7 
1 EVIDENCE AND ETHICAL KNOWLEDGE 
1. “And it never troubles him that mere accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is 
the object of his reliance, and that the same causes which make him a churchman in London 
would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Peking.”1 So wrote John Stuart Mill, with 
evident dissatisfaction, of our complacency in the face of the contingency of our most deeply 
held beliefs.  And yet, in our more reflective moments, thoughts of this kind can and do strike a 
disquieting note.  But why, exactly? Well, one wants to say, if my beliefs were in this way 
contingent; if I might’ve just as easily believed something else—then how can I have any 
confidence in what I believe at all?  
We may indeed want to say this; and I think there is an undeniably disturbing 
psychological force to such observations; but it appears glib answers won’t do here.  A little 
reflection reminds us that we have all sorts of beliefs which are, in this sense, contingent, and 
being reminded of their contingency sets off no alarms at all: it is a ‘contingent’ fact, I suppose, 
that I believe that the earth is round—others have denied it; had I been raised in different 
circumstances, I would have too.  But for all that I feel pretty complacent: I saw the pictures.   
The worry, then, tends to center on beliefs that cannot be so easily given ‘etiological 
credentials’: my normative beliefs; more narrowly, my moral convictions.  We can hardly advert, 
here, to some uncontroversial mode of direct epistemic access; evidently, I learned my morals 
                                                 
1 J.S. Mill, On Liberty, p. 17. 
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from my parents; or perhaps those beliefs are—in some sense—the ‘product’ of my evolutionary 
heritage.  Neither etiology seems particularly comforting; neither seems to promise ‘direct 
access’ to the moral facts.  Why, then, should I be so confident in these beliefs—especially when 
there are a hundred other systems of belief that (it appears) I might as easily have had?   
Worries of this kind have recently come into focus in analytic moral philosophy.2 And 
though some have argued that the worry affects a wider range of views, the most obvious target 
of ‘etiological’ challenges is moral realism.3 In particular, the problem seems worst for forms of 
non-naturalist moral realism: those views which hold that the ethical facts are ‘mind-
independent’, but deny that such facts are ‘causally efficacious’.4  In what follows, I hope to do 
the following: outline a clear version of the challenge; explain which forms of moral realism it 
does indeed cause serious problems for; and then finally to vindicate a picture of ethics which 
has every right to the title ‘non-naturalist moral realism’ and yet nevertheless escapes the puzzle.  
But if the arguments below are right, then there are other serious consequences as well: the 
assumptions which make certain forms of moral realism vulnerable to the challenge turn out to 
be very widely held, and perhaps central to other philosophical ambitions. 
                                                 
2 See: Sher 2001; Street 2006, Street n.d.; Enoch 2010; White 2010; Schafer 2010; Joyce 2006; Singer 2005.  In fact, 
these philosophers may be worried about slightly different problems; that itself is a matter of some controversy (see 
White 2010).  Enoch maintains that “no realist...has ever addressed the challenge” as he understands it; White notes 
(fn. 4) that the topic has received “surprisingly little sustained attention from analytic epistemologists.” So while the 
problem is old, interest in it, in the analytic tradition, appears to be new.  White suggests that the problem has 
received more attention in ‘continental’ philosophy; see Leiter 2004, for a discussion.  See also Williams 2002, pp. 
219-24, for a discussion of a related problem: the threat supposedly posed by the historical origins of inequitable 
systems of justice.   
3 Enoch speaks of the broader category of ‘metanormative realism’, but it is clear from his discussion that moral 
realism is part of the target.  Street, for her part, thinks that the worry affects quasi-realists, too (see Street, n.d, p.7); 
I am less sure of this, but I leave the point aside in this essay. 
4 Enoch calls such a view ‘robust’ realism (pp. 414-15).  I take my term over from Street, who uses ‘non-naturalist 
(normative) realism’ in a similar way (see n.d., p. 6).  Nevertheless, some self-styled non-naturalists (e.g., Oddie 
2005) defend forms of non-reductive moral realism which countenance causally efficacious moral facts.  
Obviously, the label (‘non-naturalist moral realism’) is not important; I use it, in any case, only to block in, for the 
moment, certain familiar, appealing views, on which moral facts are indeed causally inefficacious.  But some of the 
details of just what counts as ‘realism’ do matter, and I offer a more precise analysis in §§4-5 below.     
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2. Now the puzzle does indeed have a familiar shape, roughly the one outlined just above.  But 
getting clear on exactly what it is—and what it is not—may be a little tricky.  Sharon Street has 
recently forwarded a forceful version of the puzzle under the title of a ‘Darwinian Dilemma’ for 
moral realists.5 Her challenge, in effect, is this: the best explanation for our having the moral 
beliefs we do is some story about evolution, for, at least at the most basic level, evolution has 
been an “enormous factor in shaping the content of human values.”6 But (the argument 
continues) there is no reason to suppose that evolutionary pressures have been ‘tracking’ the 
normative facts—worse, it’s very difficult to see how they could do any such tracking if such 
facts are held to be ‘causally inert’.  It appears, then, that our best explanation of how we arrived 
at our moral beliefs is one which gives no aid or comfort to our confidence in those beliefs; if the 
body of our moral beliefs is largely correct, that could only be by enormous coincidence.  
Street’s conclusion is that we should give up on Realism altogether, on pain of embracing 
skepticism, and plump for some form of anti-realism.7 
But is evolution really the ‘best explanation’ for our moral beliefs? There is something 
rather doubtful about the idea.  What seems at least plausible is this: had we enjoyed a different 
evolutionary history, we would have different moral beliefs.  But surely something parallel can 
be said about all sorts of elements ‘upstream’ of our contemporary moral beliefs: had such-and-
such religious figure not appeared on Earth, we (or anyway, a lot of us) would have very 
                                                 
5 Street aims her arguments, in her 2006, at our ‘evaluative beliefs’ and in her n.d. at our ‘normative beliefs’.  I have 
no quarrel with these terms, but my interest is in moral epistemology; and whatever subtleties may divide the 
various terms, it is quite clear that her challenge is meant to apply to realists about the ‘moral’ realm as well.   
6 Street 2006, 114.  In fact, Street writes ‘natural selection’, rather than evolution, which, as White points out (p. 
586) may be rather dubious.  As I note below in the text, however, controversies over such subtleties would amount 
to a tempest in a teapot. 
7 Street 2006, especially 126-8.  Street’s favored form of anti-realism is something she calls ‘constructivism’, to 
which I return below.  In fact, Street contends that the naturalist realist is no better off.  Her thought is that the 
naturalist realist is in any case committed to the existence of certain natural-normative identities; and that the 
argument mounted against the non-naturalist’s moral facts applies with equal force to such identities.      
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different moral beliefs; more humbly, had I had a different upbringing, or different peers, I 
would now have rather different moral beliefs.   
Part of the force, I think, of evolutionary debunking arguments, is their insinuation that 
some element in our history controls our beliefs.8  But the mere truth of some counterfactual 
claim, to the effect that, had things been different, I would not believe what I now do, could not 
by itself undermine the possibility of rational control over that belief. (Or else we are dealing 
with a much more general form of skepticism.9)  But even if we waive this difficulty, it is not 
prima facie obvious that evolution has even been more ‘influential’ than various other causal 
factors.  What we would need to establish the stronger claim is, I think, a further premise to the 
effect that our moral beliefs are largely insensitive to other perturbations in our causal histories: a 
different upbringing (e.g.) would not result in radically different moral views.10   
Might that be true? I doubt it myself; an argument to that effect would in any case be 
rather speculative.  The etiological skeptic is fond of reminding us of the huge variety of possible 
moral belief systems that people might hold; he may be less quick to note that, in imagining such 
people, we are presumably imagining other products of evolution.  If such thought experiments 
are to be trusted, it appears that our evolutionary history is compatible with a very large variety 
of ethical outlooks; so the idea of evolution ‘influencing’ our moral beliefs must be 
                                                 
8 Street speaks repeatedly of evolution “shaping” our beliefs in her 2006 (pp. 109, 110, 113, 117, 121, et alibi) and 
of what evolution “led us” to believe in her n.d (pp. 12, 14, 17, et alibi).  She draws attention to some difficulties 
with the latter term at p. 12, fn. 18, of the latter. 
9 If we accepted such a principle, then the truth of determinism would be enough to show that we have rational 
control over none of our beliefs.  For, surely, there is some element, in the causal history of every belief, a) for 
which some such counterfactual  is true, and b) which is not itself a reason to believe.  It would follow that every 
belief is ‘controlled’ by some rationally irrelevant causal factor.  An illuminating discussion of this and nearby 
issues can be found in Lavin 2004, especially pp. 443-446.  See also White, p. 574.   
10 Oddly, Street seems to think that she needs only the weaker, counterfactual-dependence condition: see her 2006 
p.120 and fn. 21. 
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correspondingly weakened.  (Or when we imagine the ‘coherent Caligula’, are we somehow 
imagining someone who is not the product of evolutionary forces?)   
Perhaps it will be felt that our evolutionary history at least makes certain moral views 
more likely to be held by human beings.  Something like that does seem plausible. (On the other 
hand, we might consider the variety of moral views held in different eras and different places.)11 
But it is hard to know exactly how damaging such a reflection could be.  I think it is tempting to 
understand the idea of ‘evolution making more likely’ as ‘evolution exerting some weak-ish 
control over us’.  But this is probably just a mistake: given the fact that someone put twice as 
many black balls as white balls into this urn, it’s more likely that I’ll select a black one; but that 
doesn’t mean that our putting twice as many black balls in as white ones made this one black.12    
Thankfully, however, we can leave the whole issue behind us since, it appears, the 
etiological skeptical skeptic is not committed to putting her challenge in terms of evolution.13 As 
David Enoch has recently argued, the real problem for the non-naturalist moral realist is not so 
much that the story about ‘where we got’ our moral beliefs is disconcerting; the real problem is 
that this kind of realist appears to be barred from any kind of explanation for how we might be 
reliable in our moral judgments—or, in other terms, barred from explaining the ‘coincidence’ (in 
                                                 
11 This point would also have to be kept separate from the very plausible, but surely harmless, thesis that many of 
our moral beliefs track certain evolutionary facts for the very good reason that certain rules only apply to us in virtue 
of particular (and no doubt contingent) facts about our biology. 
12 Cf. White’s related discussion of “Adam’s Party” at 586ff.  There are further possibilities here.  It might be said 
that it makes sense, given our evolutionary history, that we should have a disposition to believe some moral systems 
over others—say, kin-centric ones.  The disposition is then non-truth tracking; but explains our beliefs; this is 
supposed to engender skepticism.  Once again, I am not at all sure just what dispositions to believe I’d expect 
evolutionary history to equip us with; and the variety of actual moral views might make us doubt that there really 
are any such dispositions in the area.  If we could be so convinced, we might take the patent difficulty of inculcating 
moral beliefs into children to be evidence that ‘our’ moral system in fact runs contrary to what evolution has 
‘disposed’ us to believe.  But evidently a sounder understanding of a disposition would be required to sort this out.     
13 Street herself concedes this at p. 155 (2006).  The argument of Street, n.d., relies less heavily on evolution, 
speaking instead of “upbringing, history, culture, education” as well as “genetic inheritance” (e.g., at p.12).  In fact, 
‘evolution’ plays a rather different role in this argument: it is wheeled in to shore up a disanalogy between normative 
beliefs and (roughly) perceptual beliefs: see pp. 25ff.   
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the most anodyne sense of that word) of my moral beliefs and the moral facts.14 Whatever the 
causal story is which explains where our moral beliefs came from, it is hard to see how that story 
could explain how we might be reliable here: for the moral facts are supposed (by the non-
naturalist) to be causally inert; and the realist can hardly allow that our moral beliefs compose 
the moral facts without giving up on realism.15  
The worry could be put this way.  Although every adult recognizes that not every moral 
judgment she has ever made was correct, and so recognizes her capacity for error; nevertheless 
we take it that, generally speaking, we are indeed reliable in moral matters: we would, when 
presented with some situation for moral evaluation, judge correctly (most of the time).  And yet 
this can seem quite mysterious: just what explains this talent?   
Nor does an argument of this shape need to presuppose that we begin without any 
justified moral beliefs.  It can allow that, initially, we have some justification for (say) moral 
judgment M in the form of other moral propositions.  The idea is that, having discovered that the 
correlation between the moral facts and my moral beliefs is inexplicable, our initial justification 
is undermined: if it is inexplicable how our moral-belief-forming mechanism could be reliable, 
                                                 
14 See Enoch 2010, esp. p. 421ff.: “So there is a correlation between...normative truths and our normative judgments.  
What explains this correlation?” Enoch trades back and forth between putting the problem in terms of reliability and 
putting it in terms of the “correlation between...normative truths and our normative judgments.”  I come back to this 
issue in §3 below.  Cf. also Field 1989 (p.25ff) for a parallel argument against mathematical Platonism. 
15 That is Street’s answer.  Among other possible interpretations of our problem—characterized as the one “raised 
by the apparent causes of our beliefs”—White considers something like the version just given in the text (attributing 
it to Schechter) at 592ff. of his 2010.  (He also notes that it might be what “lie[s] behind” Street’s argument.) But he 
dismisses it rather glibly, on the strength of the following analogy: suppose we had a robot which was given a 
randomly produced program for generating strings of arithmetical symbols; now suppose that, on examining its 
output, we discovered that the robot was emitting all and only true arithmetical propositions.  In that case, White 
writes, “the tension...seems to push in just one direction: against the assumption that the program was randomly 
produced.” But as a solution to our difficulty, this seems doubly mistaken: what, in the first place, would be the 
analogue of ‘not randomly produced’? Who or what can we suppose to have given us our non-random program for 
generating moral beliefs? Then too, it may be relevant here that, though we can (I think) imagine very different, but 
internally coherent moral systems, it is much harder to do the same for math.  This matters, since part of what 
generated the tension in the original challenge was the fact that we must believe that our system is superior to 
others’ (if only hypothetical and imaginable others); if there is only one coherent system, the challenge becomes, if 
not trivial, anyway much less worrying. 
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then we are blocked from using any beliefs formed in this way as justification for anything.16 
The upshot is that moral realism appears to entail moral skepticism: moral realists are apparently 
committed to a view according to which there are indeed ‘mind-independent’ moral facts, but it 
is impossible to explain how we are onto them—we could all be wildly wrong.      
The obvious contrast case will be classes of perceptual belief.  If, for example, our friend 
Jones claims to know all sorts of facts about the dark side of the moon and, consulting NASA 
data, we discover that there is, as a matter of fact, a wonderfully high correlation between 
Jones’s beliefs and the facts-as-reported-by-NASA, then, I think, we will be in the market for 
some kind of explanation of this correlation.  We will be satisfied if we come to believe, say, that 
Jones was an astronaut, or anyway had been to the moon, and seen the various things he reports.  
In short, the explanation for the ‘correlation’ of belief and fact is a mode of brute access to the 
facts, sc., Jones’s faculty of sight.  The point is sometimes put17 in terms of a “causal route” from 
the facts to Jones, or anyway a causal story about perception; and although this way of putting it 
strikes me as somewhat misleading, it is useful for reminding us of another way that we could be 
satisfied with Jones, sc., that he might claim to be in possession of evidence for the various facts 
he reports: perhaps something about the moon’s movements is good evidence that there is a 
crater on the dark side, or something of the sort.  Very roughly, the movements would be 
symptoms of the crater, and hence evidence for it.  And now the problem is supposed to be that, 
insofar as we take moral facts to be ‘causally inert’, it will be impossible to see either how we 
could have some (causally understood) faculty for directly apprehending moral facts (analogous 
to sight); or how there could be evidence for—in other words, items causally downstream of and 
                                                 
16 Cf. Enoch, pp. 423-4.  The requirement that we first be able to tell a story about why our moral judgments might 
be reliable before acquiring any moral justification is too strong: such a requirement would have equally devastating 
effects for (e.g.) perception. 
17 E.g. by Enoch at p. 421; Street n.d., also invokes “causal forces,” at p. 25 et alibi.   
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hence symptoms of—these causally inert moral facts.  The conclusion will be that we must either 
relinquish non-naturalist realism, or else become skeptics about moral knowledge.     
It may now seem that the form of the challenge has nothing particularly to do with the 
etiology of our moral beliefs at all; but I think that would be too hasty a conclusion.  I return to 
this point below. 
 
3. Nevertheless, there is perhaps something dubious about this talk of ‘explaining our reliability’.  
Enoch’s thought,18 as we have seen, is that if we have no idea how we might explain our 
reliability in moral matters, then we either have to settle for an inexplicable correlation (between 
belief and fact) or, if that is unacceptable, give up on regarding our moral faculty as reliable; and 
therefore give up on our ‘internal’ justification; and therefore become skeptics about moral 
knowledge.  But what exactly would it mean to be reliable in moral matters? 
It is important in the first place to recognize that the challenge is not to certify or non-
circularly justify our reliability; if that were the challenge, perception would be in equally bad 
shape.19 The challenge is rather to explain our reliability.   
But reliability in what? If the question were how it is that, over time, I can be expected to 
make correct moral judgments, then surely the answer is: I have some basic stock of moral 
beliefs which are true.  Since my future judgments are rooted in these basic beliefs, they are 
likely, though of course not guaranteed, to be correct.20   
                                                 
18 Street n.d. is plausibly interpreted this way, too.  What she adds is a story which is supposed to be a more 
plausible explanation for the source of our beliefs (than any realist story).  Joshua Stuchlik, in an unpublished MS, 
takes a similar line, and calls the challenge the ‘Argument from Reliability’.   
19 Cf. White 2010, p. 591; 603-4; see also fn. 16 above.  
20 These beliefs need not be ‘basic’ in any especially demanding sense; the point is that the reliability of (occurrent) 
moral judgments is plausibly explained by some stock of (standing) moral beliefs.   
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Attention will focus, then, on this stock of basic moral beliefs.  And the question 
becomes: how can we explain the correlation between these beliefs, and the moral facts?  In 
terms of reliability, the point becomes: we have no way of explaining why it is that this stock of 
moral beliefs should have been more likely to be true than false.  Whereas, in the perceptual case, 
this is just what we do have; for the causal story, no matter how sketchily described, appears to 
explain why it is that our perceptual beliefs are more likely to be true than false.21 
 
4. One way to get a purchase on things here is to consider the other obvious way in which the 
correlation of moral belief and fact might be explained, sc., a kind of constitutive account 
according to which the moral facts are somehow or other dependent on, or a function of, our 
moral beliefs.  This is the essence of Street’s alternative to realism, a view she calls 
‘constructivism’.22  The view is, very roughly, that the normative facts—facts about what I have 
reason to do—are a “complex function” of my various other normative beliefs, evaluative 
attitudes, desires, and so on.  In particular, R is a reason for me to Φ, just in case that very 
judgment (“R is a reason for me to Φ”) withstands scrutiny from the perspective of my other 
judgments about what I have reason to do.23 Street characterizes her view as a brand of 
antirealism; and it is supposed to have, as we saw, the distinct merit of being able to explain the 
‘correlation’ between moral belief and fact; as she puts it: 
                                                 
21 This distinction between two kinds of reliability—reliability as ‘likely to get judgments right in new cases’, and 
reliability as ‘likely to have one’s standing beliefs in this domain be true’—is masked, I think, by the fact that the 
explanation is the same in the perceptual case; whereas they potentially come apart in the ethical case.  This might 
also explain Enoch’s (otherwise very odd) definition of ‘reliability’: “a class of beliefs is reliable...if and only if a 
sufficiently large portion of it is true” (418). (In fairness, Enoch flags his definition as unusual.)   
22 Street’s view is presented as a metanormative, rather than metaethical view (see n.d., passim), and so I discuss it 
in those terms; see fn. 4, above.   
23 See Street, n.d., p. 13.  Street speaks of “one’s own set of evaluative attitudes,” but this phrase covers a host of 
desiderative states and evaluative judgments.  The story perhaps recalls Williams’s in “Internal and External 
Reasons,” a point which Street notes at n.d., pp. 4-5, 35. 
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If constructivism is true, then of course there’s a striking coincidence between true normative 
judgments, on the one hand, and the normative judgments that causal forces led us to make, on 
the other, because normative truth just is a (rather complex) function of the normative judgments 
that causal forces led us to make.24 
There is an obvious sense in which such a view strikes us as ‘antirealist’: what I have reason to 
do is not, ultimately, entirely independent of what I believe I have reason to do.  But, 
interestingly, on certain familiar definitions, Street’s view is technically a realist view after all: it 
is possible (however improbable) for an agent to make mistakes about what he has reason to 
do—he may, e.g., fail to give his beliefs sufficient ‘scrutiny’; fail to weigh his various reasons 
against each other properly; and so on.25   
Now no one would deny, I think, that Constructivism is anti-realist in spirit, even if it 
comes out as a form of realism on one familiar scheme; there are, in the last analysis, no facts 
about what I have reason to do to do that are completely independent of what I want, am in favor 
of, believe to be a reason, etc.—in short, no facts about what I ought to do independent of my 
other evaluative attitudes and judgments.  As we might put it: though there are kinds of mistake 
that one can make, there are other kinds of mistake one can’t make. 
                                                 
24 See Street, n.d., p. 14.  As a matter of fact, it is not so clear that Street’s solution solves the puzzle (which, again, 
she poses as one for normative beliefs) in the way that she claims for it.  If we accepted Constructivism, we would, it 
appears, have an explanation for why my normative beliefs about what I have reason to do largely coincide with the 
facts about what I have reason to do.  But this is surely just one subset of my normative beliefs: the self-regarding or 
‘first-personal’ ones.  And so far from providing an explanation for why my ‘third-personal’ or other-regarding 
normative beliefs match the (third-personal) moral facts, I shall, having accepted Constructivism, have to concede 
that I was wrong about some (potentially) very large subset of my normative beliefs: for instance, “No one has a 
reason to torture puppies for fun.” It’s surely hopeless to try to get a fix on what ‘percentage’ of my normative 
beliefs I’ll have to give up (that would require getting a fix on the number of total normative beliefs I hold, surely an 
absurd task); but insofar as there are any normative beliefs I can be said to ‘have’, a lot of them will be ‘third-
personal’ (other-regarding, really) in the sense of the example just given.  And these will all have to go.  So we 
might say: half the work of meeting the epistemological challenge is done by the ‘constitutivist’ move; half the work 
is done by junking an enormous number of normative beliefs.  This consequence of the theory is obscured in Street’s 
exposition by her use of the plural first-person pronouns.  This point is picked up below, in the text. 
25 The ‘familiar’ definition of realism is: we are realists about some domain if we regard propositions in that domain 
as truth-evaluable and not all false.  I myself prefer the more minimal ‘possible to make mistakes’, but nothing here 
turns on it; indeed, nothing turns on how we classify constructivism, either.      
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But the fact that Constructivism is, in one sense anyway, a kind of realism, is important if 
only for this reason: supposing that Street is right that Constructivism meets the epistemological 
challenge that she sets up, it transpires that there are forms of realism that can indeed meet the 
challenge.  This reflection might inspire us to wonder just what other kinds of realism might 
meet the challenge—whether there might not be more robust, and in particular non-subjectivist, 
versions which do.  To determine that, it would be useful to look at the broad structure of the 
puzzle, with the aim of working out an abstract characterization of the kinds of realism that 
might succeed. 
 
5. Evidently, we need, in the first place, for it to be possible to be wrong—this gives us realism.  
But another requirement for a form of robust realism must be this: it must be possible to locate at 
least one class of error exactly where people have (apparent) disagreements with each other in 
ethical matters.  That is, it must be possible to understand the disagreements between two parties 
as plausibly turning on a mistake that one party is making.  We need this element in order to 
prevent the view from becoming a variety of subjectivism, a point which can be brought out by 
again contrasting constructivism.  We saw that constructivism allows one narrow kind of error—
roughly, an accounting error.  But although, if constructivism were true, it would be possible, 
when I say to Caligula, “You have a reason to stop torturing that puppy,” and he contradicts me, 
to suppose that Caligula has made an accounting error—has actually misapplied the relevant 
function to his other evaluative attitudes; has, in effect, gotten wrong what he actually has reason 
to do—although it would be possible to suppose this, in practice, no one ever would (or does).26 
                                                 
26 And yet it may be worth saying that, if we were truly banned from using the language of ‘external reasons’, it 
might be that this is exactly what we would dispute.  As Hobbes memorably put it: “For I doubt not, but if it had 
been a thing contrary to any man’s right of dominion, or the interest of men that have dominion, that the three angles 
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If, conversely, we can understand standard cases of ethical disagreement as turning on an error 
made by one party, then we open the way for an objectivist epistemology. 
We need this possibility, in any case, for a sane realism.  But is this really what we need 
to ward off subjectivism? After all, isn’t ‘ultimately not independent of my attitudes’ sufficient 
for subjectivism? –Obviously there is no point in quarrelling over the word.  But consider: what 
should we call a view that allowed that all facts about what I ought to do were a function of (say) 
my desires; but also allowed that I am often wrong about my desires? The possibility of 
construing things this way is perhaps not so far-fetched: we do say sometimes, “You think you 
want this, but you don’t really.” My point is not to vindicate such expressions (it will be objected 
that they are, in some sense, figurative language; or perhaps someone will say that desiderative 
states are ‘transparent’); but only to insist that a sane realism could allow that (anyway) facts 
about what I ought to do supervene entirely on facts about what I want to do—so long as it 
allowed that disagreements between Jones and Smith over what Jones ought to do could be 
construed as disagreements over what Jones desires; and that Jones might indeed be the one 
making the mistake.   
Perhaps such a view should nevertheless be called ‘subjectivist’; it seems in any case to 
be a kind of subjectivism we can live with.  Subjectivist theories become revisionist—and, by 
that token, disturbing—only when they insist that Jones cannot be contradicted (say, by Smith) 
when he makes a judgment about what he has reason to do.  What we need, again, is for it to be 
                                                                                                                                                             
of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square, that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the 
burning of all books of geometry suppressed, as far as he whom it concerned was able” (Leviathan, Part 1, Ch. XI, 
§21).       
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possible to construe ethical disagreements as turning on an error by one party, where there is a 
real possibility that either party is making the error.27  
On the other hand, of course, we need this kind of error to be immune to the etiological 
challenge: it must not be possible to re-raise the skeptical puzzle about the kind of error that our 
view makes possible.   
We have, then, three desiderata for a sound moral realism: the view (1) must allow for the 
possibility of error or mistake (that ensures realism); (2) that error—or anyway, some form of 
error—must be locatable exactly where moral disagreements break out (that ensures 
objectivism); and (3) it must not be possible to raise the skeptical worry around the possibility of 
this kind of error.   
Putting things the other way round, we could say that ‘etiological’ skepticisms evidently 
turn on the possibility of a certain kind of error.  In one way, this is obvious, since to suppose, as 
any skepticism must, that we might be wrong—wildly wrong, even—about all of our judgments, 
is to suppose that we might be making some kind of mistake.  But the importance of this point 
can only emerge when we recognize that there are different species of possible error.  What we 
would need, then, to defeat such skepticisms, is to construct something which would count as a 
realism—something, that is, which would allow for a certain kind of ‘robust’ error, along the 
lines outlined above—but on which an error of the kind imputed by such skepticism is not 
                                                 
27 This last reflection points to a possible tension: it may be hard to sustain a ‘revisionist’ subjectivism that doesn’t 
collapse into antirealism.  For, insofar as a subjectivism allows that one can be mistaken (i.e., insofar as it is not a 
form of antirealism), it will be possible (however implausible) to locate ethical disagreements just where these 
mistakes are, and therefore for anyone to be contradicted; and so the subjectivism will not be revisionist after all.  
(See fn. 24.) As we could put it: the way in which Jones “can’t be contradicted” must not turn on the metaphysical 
impossibility of error (that would be antirealism); but only on something like Jones being in a relatively (to everyone 
else) advantageous epistemic position with respect to reasons-for-Jones.  Since some version of the last thesis is 
plausible on every metaethical view, it may transpire that subjectivism is a relative affair.    
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possible.  To do that, we obviously must begin by isolating the species of error which such 
skepticisms presuppose.  First, then, a detour into kinds of error.   
 
6. In order to get a fix on this idea of different ‘kinds of error’, I want to introduce an apparatus 
for distinguishing kinds of epistemic support. 
Now the word ‘evidence’ is often used as a generic term for the epistemic support given 
by some justifier for some conclusion.  I have no quarrel with that use of the word; but in what 
follows I’d like to distinguish between two quite different ways in which justifiers can support a 
conclusion; and restrict the word ‘evidence’ to one species of justifier.28  The possibility of such 
a distinction turns, as will become clear, on a further distinction, sc., that between (what we 
could call) different levels of directness of epistemic access. 
The paradigm case of evidential support, as I shall be using the term, might be a (certain 
kind of) jury trial: on the basis of (what we indeed call) evidence, we are supposed to come to a 
conclusion about whether (say) Jones killed Smith.  It seems clear enough how such ‘evidence’ 
might support that conclusion; roughly, we reason by inference to the best explanation.  So, e.g., 
the best explanation for the footprint on the lawn, the blood in Jones’s car, and so on and so 
forth, is (let’s suppose) that Jones killed Smith.  The blood, the footprint—these are understood 
as symptoms of the murder-of-Smith-by-Jones in a familiar sense: a causal chain connecting 
them to such an event type makes them reliable indicators of it.  By the same token, a conclusion 
on the basis of evidence—“Jones killed Smith”—is undermined when we are given an 
alternative explanation which is more plausible as the source of this evidence.   
                                                 
28 I think that this is in line with ordinary usage, but that is irrelevant. 
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Now sometimes the evidence can be overwhelming—only a fool would deny that Jones 
did it.  But for all that, there remains—what we could call—a mode of more direct epistemic 
access to the facts; here, that mode is plausibly ‘seeing that’.  Of course, we are supposing that 
no one did see Jones kill Smith, or else the footprint and the blood would all be de trop.29  In 
fact, this is the feature of ‘evidential support’ to which I’d like to draw attention: if we have, or 
come to have, direct access to the facts—say, the fact that p—the evidence drops away as 
irrelevant; so that, e.g., if I see that p, it would make no sense to reproach me with evidence that 
~p—and, more to the point, ridiculous to add anything about the evidence for the proposition 
that p.  Having obtained direct access to the fact, the evidence drops away as irrelevant.  The 
point, of course, is not to deny that, sometimes, we might even come to doubt that some putative 
mode of direct access was operating correctly; of course we are fallible.  The point is only that 
we don’t treat the blood or the footprint as on all fours with seeing that; we treat the latter as a 
more direct mode of access to the facts; plausibly, as the most direct form of access.  (What 
could be more direct than seeing that something is so?)   
By the same token, to speak of something as evidence for some proposition is implicitly 
to suppose that there is some mode of more direct epistemic access to the facts—presumably, a 
mode which, for some practical reason or other, is cut off from us (else we’d have no need of 
evidence).  Something counts as evidence, then, only in contrast to a more direct mode of access.  
Evidence acts to support some conclusion; but, again, given the mode of more direct access, the 
evidence drops away as irrelevant.   
I now want to contrast a rather different way in which reasons might support conclusions.  
It can be summed up very quickly by saying that, in the case of this kind of support, it is 
                                                 
29 Obviously I am not denying that we can make mistakes about what we think we saw; only that, in ordinary 
circumstances, seeing that things are so is taken to be a mode of more direct—in fact, brute—access to the facts. 
 22 
impossible to appreciate some conclusion independently of the justifiers for it.  There is no mode 
of brute access to the facts—a mode of epistemic access independent of the justifiers supporting 
that conclusion.  On the contrary, we can only see that the conclusion is true in light of the 
justifiers for it; there would be no such thing as just seeing that it is true.  Since these units of 
epistemic support do not imply a contrast with a more direct mode of access, they cannot be 
called ‘evidence’; I propose to call them, simply, ‘reasons’, and the kind of support they provide 
‘rational support’.  Evidential support and rational support are then, in this terminology, two 
species of the genus justification. 
Is there any domain of knowledge plausibly structured by the ‘rational support’ model? 
Obviously, in a moment, I am going to make the case that moral knowledge has this form.  But it 
would be nice to have another.  In fact I think there are several; which one the reader finds 
persuasive will depend on her philosophical persuasion.  Here are two examples, both, 
incidentally, owing to Anscombe. 
First, then, we might consider knowledge in intention, on one familiar story about what it 
is to act intentionally.30  According to this story, when one acts intentionally, one knows what 
one is doing, in the sense of being able to explain, or give reasons why, one is doing what she is 
doing.  If one cannot answer the question ‘Why?’, she cannot be said to be intentionally acting: 
there is no knowing what one is doing apart from knowing why one is doing it.31  This point 
could be put by saying that what we say in response to the question ‘Why?’ does not play the 
role of evidence for the conclusion “I am doing such-and-such”; on the contrary, there is no more 
direct mode of access to what I am doing, a mode which might answer that question 
independently of the justifiers.  We could put the point, in another way, by saying: insofar as I 
                                                 
30 The ‘familiar story’ comes from Anscombe’s monograph Intention.   
31 Maybe there are odd or unusual cases; the point is about the paradigm case. 
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know what I’m (intentionally) doing, I know why I’m doing it; and insofar as I know why I’m 
doing it, I know that I am.       
Perhaps this sort of case will be felt to be metaphysically mysterious.  There are in any 
event other sorts of cases which appear to have this structure.  Anscombe, in fact, draws attention 
to another sort of example: the domain of what we could call ‘owes-facts’—facts about who 
owes what to whom.32 Anscombe’s thought could be summarized in the following way.  Given a 
certain institutional background, some facts are (what she calls) brute, relative to others; some 
number out of a range of the former descriptions (say xyz) must hold for a description (say A) of 
the latter kind to hold; but there is no guarantee that, xyz being true, A will be true.  Thus, “The 
grocer supplied me with potatoes” and “I signed a bill” are brute, relative to “I owe the grocer 
such-and-such sum of money.” But the truth of the former statements don’t guarantee the truth of 
the latter, since there may be some exceptional circumstances which infirm the inference—it 
could be, as Anscombe notes, that we are on a movie set.  Furthermore, there are other 
descriptions which are brute, relative to the members of xyz: thus “He left a quarter of potatoes at 
my house” (and perhaps some other facts) are brute relative to the description “He supplied me 
with a quarter of potatoes.” 
Three things are worth noticing about this structure.  First, the descriptions xyz are not 
evidence (in my sense) for A: there is no mode of coming to see, e.g., that she owes the grocer 
such-and-such a sum, independently of seeing that she was supplied with potatoes, and so on.  
Second, xyz doesn’t just mean A: that point is secured by the possibility of exceptional 
                                                 
32 See Anscombe’s “On Brute Facts,” (1958b).  The point of the paper is, in effect, to subvert Hume’s famous 
conclusion that there was something illicit about the inference from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’. Anscombe’s strategy was 
to show that things are exactly parallel with the inference from ‘is’ to ‘owes’.  Some have understood the paper to be 
making a point in general about institutional facts, but I am not sure this is the best way to put it.  Cf. also 
Anscombe’s, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” (1958a) which recapitulates and expands on the material in “On Brute 
Facts.”    
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circumstances infirming the relation.  Finally, there is no reason to suppose that we can 
adumbrate, in advance, all possible exceptional circumstances; for, as Anscombe notes, “one can 
theoretically always suppose a further special context for each special context, which puts it in a 
new light”;33 consequently, there is no reason to suppose we can give a reductive definition of A.       
There may be other regions of thought structured by this form of justification; but these 
two examples will suffice for present purposes. 
 
7. Now as we noted, etiological skepticisms about morality can—and, truly, should—allow that 
we do have some justification for our moral beliefs: just whatever reasons we have in support of 
those beliefs.  But the idea is that this kind of justification is undermined, since we are precluded 
(by the causally-inert status of moral facts) from giving any explanation of the correlation 
between fact and belief here.  My contention now is that this idea presupposes a very particular 
sort of error—an error possible, in particular, in regions regimented by our evidence model of 
justification, and nowhere else. 
Why, after all, is our initial justification supposed to be undermined? The plausibility of 
that contention turns, I think, on treating those (putative) facts, which are cast in the role of 
justification for some conclusion, as evidence—that is, as symptoms of the fact-to-be-justified.  
And what is true, I think, is that we have no notion of how anything could be a symptom of 
something non-causal.  The conclusion from this premise—that justification here has the form of 
evidence—must be that the force of this evidence is undermined.   
We can see now why etiological accounts of our moral beliefs—evolution, our 
idiosyncratic upbringing, and so on—appear to be threatening: these explanations for the source 
                                                 
33 1958b, p. 70. 
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or origin of our moral beliefs are intended to play the role of alternative or rival explanations—
alternative to any explanation that invokes ‘moral facts’.34 
But perhaps it was a misstep to regard this kind of justification as evidence in the first 
place.  For—and this is the point—what etiological skepticisms are in the business of insinuating 
is that (unfortunately for us) we cannot preclude the possibility of precisely the ‘jury-trial’ sort of 
mistake: the kind of mistake which, if the foregoing thoughts were sound, presupposes a more 
direct mode of epistemic access; and thus, here, a kind of epistemic access to the facts which is 
independent of the justifiers for it.      
The upshot of these reflections is that we ought to reject a view according to which such 
a ‘more direct’ mode of access to the moral facts is possible.  In one way, this may seem sensible 
enough—won’t any such view have to wheel in, at some point, some metaphysically dubious 
‘moral faculty’? That seems right enough to me, but the rejection of such ‘brute access’, and with 
it, the evidence model, may have further-reaching implications.  For in rejecting this model, we 
evidently embrace a view according to which it is impossible to recognize a moral fact 
independently of the reasons for it.  I shall return to some of the possible implications of this 
conclusion at the end.35  
Here let me note one other consequence: in rejecting the evidential model, what we reject 
is the idea that the source of our moral beliefs matters.  The skeptical puzzle, it will be recalled, 
insinuated that our moral beliefs were in worse shape that our perceptual beliefs, where we had 
                                                 
34 And here the argument makes contact with Harman’s famous discussion of moral explanations.   
35 One possible implication which I can only touch on here is for the topic of moral testimony.  The implication is 
roughly that moral testimony cannot transmit moral knowledge, since it cannot transmit the reasons in light of which 
the (putative) moral fact is true; or, if we wish to change idioms, it can transmit moral knowledge, but not moral 
understanding (see Hills 2009 for a view in this range).  It might be objected that testimony can also transmit the 
reasons.  But, as it seems to me, even if it does so, what it cannot transmit—or rather, what it is not guaranteed to 
transmit—is seeing that M is so in light of those reasons.  If it does transmit this, then I see no reason to call the 
process ‘moral testimony’: surely no one denies that one man can convince another of some moral conclusion; if 
there is a controversy over the topic of moral testimony, it is not over this fact.    
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at least some kind of explanation for our reliability.  But what was the force of such a causal 
explanation? My suggestion now is that the causal story explains our reliability in the perceptual 
case because it explains how our beliefs might be connected to the proper source.  If we give up 
on the idea that the source of our ethical beliefs is relevant to their truth, we give up on one kind 
of mistake that might be made in this domain.  That there are other sorts of mistakes—and hence 
moral truth and knowledge—was the point of the foregoing arguments.  (I shall try to say a little 
more about this below.)      
Should we believe that ethical knowledge has this form? Or is it just a convenient way 
out of our bind? One clue, I think, that something like this must be right might be found in a 
humble, natural-language observation.  When we want to query someone’s claim about (e.g.) 
some fact about middle-sized dry goods—“There’s a raccoon in the attic”—we ask him, “How 
do you know?” In ordinary circumstances, we are satisfied by the reply, “I saw it.” On the other 
hand, we would never ask that question in order to query anyone’s moral claims—say, “Pirating 
music is wrong”—and, correspondingly, there is no mode of ‘direct access’ to which anyone 
could advert.  On the contrary, we ask, “Why?” when we ask for the credentials of a moral belief; 
and the answer will be in the form of reasons to believe.  In assessing the correctness of a moral 
belief, that is, we don’t care where it ‘came from’.   
But how then do we ‘explain the correlation’ between moral beliefs and moral facts? If 
what I have written above is sound, then we should reject the question.  Given certain 
presuppositions, the causal story about perception does indeed explain why our perceptual 
beliefs are, ceteris paribus, more likely to be correct than not: their (causal) connection to their 
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objects explains this.36  What we should admit, I think, is that if we restrict ourselves to stories 
about the origins of our moral beliefs, these beliefs are not more likely to be correct than not.  
But this should not be troubling: if ‘wrong source’ is not the name for one of the kinds of error in 
ethics, we should hardly be troubled by the fact that their etiology does not explain their 
correctness.37  We cannot miss what it was impossible to have. 
 
8. Nevertheless, even if the foregoing thoughts are sound, only half the work would be done by 
quarantining the kind of error that must not be possible on a sound moral realism.  The other 
essential task is the one noted above: we need a positive characterization of the kind of error that 
is supposed to be, not only possible, but at the center of moral disagreements.  Can this be done?  
Here is one suggestion: we might construe the pattern of moral justification on the model 
of ‘owes-facts’, discussed above.  Thus, any moral claim M is justified by, and indeed, seen to be 
true in light of, some further descriptions, xyz.  So, e.g., the claim “You ought to return his 
sword” is justified by (say) the further claims “That sword belongs to him” and “You have used 
it for the purpose for which you borrowed it” (or some such thing).  But of course, some further 
fact w could impair the claim “You ought to return it”—say, something to the effect that its 
owner would likely harm himself with it if given it back.  Nor is it the case, we might add, that 
we could list in advance all of the possible further conditions which would impair the claim.   
Whatever else can be said about its plausibility, what this model provides us with is a 
way of understanding how ethical disagreements between two parties might turn on an error 
                                                 
36 On the other hand I should state here that the precise way in which the causal story ‘explains the correlation’ 
between belief and fact in the perceptual case is not perfectly clear.  Light does not, after all, bounce off the facts.  
What we would need, I think, is a story about the metaphysics of facts; and in particular about the relation between 
objects and facts—murky matters indeed. 
37 There are of course certain kinds of ‘source’ stories that would affect our confidence in our beliefs: moralized 
stories. (“Your peer group is corrupt.”) But this is evidently beside the point. 
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made by one of the parties, where the imputation of that error to one’s interlocutor does not 
involve relapsing into the evidence model of justification: the imputed error is just that one’s 
interlocutor is missing something and that, once articulated, he would see it and realize his 
conclusion has been undermined.  And it does seem right to say that many moral disagreements 
really do have this form: we remind someone of some further fact obtaining and, acknowledging 
it, he comes to see the truth of our claim in light of this ‘further fact’.  And though it could not be 
claimed, with a straight face, that all ethical disagreements have this form, nevertheless the fact 
that some do is an important point to register; it reminds us that there can be such a thing as 
rational argument in ethics; and that not all disputes boil down immediately to (apparently) 
intractable disagreement.   
But of course we know that the difficult ethical disagreements do not appear to have this 
shape.  The difficult ones are those in which our interlocutor does not even acknowledge the 
relationship between the (putative) reasons and the conclusion.  Are we thrown back then, on 
imputing to our interlocutor an error of the banished kind?  
I think we are not.  What we appear to be committed to, by the non-evidential model of 
moral reasoning, is only this: we must believe, even in cases where we despair of convincing our 
interlocutor of some moral proposition M, that there is nevertheless some further fact obtaining 
which, if we could articulate it, a) would be something that our interlocutor would accept in 
itself; and b) would get him to see that M is so.  We are committed, that is, to the idea that a kind 
of rational persuasion is always possible.  
This is, at best, a rough sketch of a view.  But we should still ask: Might this view satisfy 
our three desiderata outlined above (§5)? It seems clear that the view does allow for error; 
besides basic errors of fact, there is this, rather distinctive kind: it is always possible to suppose, 
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anyway in the abstract, that not all of the facts are in, that there might be some further 
consideration which, once pointed out, would reverse our conclusion.  I have just been arguing 
that the second condition is met as well: it will always be possible to construe ethical 
disagreement as turning on this kind of error.  But the central test is the last one: can the 
skeptical puzzle be raised here? Are we committed, merely by introducing this kind of error, to 
an inexplicable correlation of moral belief and fact?  
It seems to me we are not.  Recall that the puzzle allows that some of our moral beliefs 
may, initially, be justified.  If I was correct above, then this initial justification is undermined by 
the puzzle only if we regard the kind of justification we have too narrowly—if we understand it 
as evidence.  For in that case it really will be mysterious how we could have any such evidence.  
But if our justification for our moral beliefs does not have the form of evidence—is not to be 
regarded as something causally downstream of the facts—then, I think, our justification is not 
undermined; and we are therefore in a position to explain the correlation of belief and fact.  –It 
will be, to be sure, a circular story; but that leaves our moral beliefs no worse off than, say, our 
perceptual beliefs.38           
 
9. So much for moral disagreement.  What emerges, for moral epistemology, is a picture 
according to which we can’t be radically cut off from the moral facts: even if we are wrong now, 
there must be a path from our current set of beliefs to the correct ones.       
                                                 
38 See fn. 16 above.  There may be, ultimately, something dissatisfying about our inability to give an independent 
account of the reliability of some faculty.  But this is a familiar issue, and in any case, not local to ethics.  Cf. White 
603-4. 
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What we appear to be precluded from doing is supposing that our main way of coming to 
appreciate moral facts is by way of any kind of evidence.39 In one way, as I say, this seems 
sound enough: there is something distinctly off-key about asking for ‘evidence’ that (say) killing 
the innocent is wrong.  (Evidence belongs in a box with the enquiry “How do you know?”) But 
in another way, this may be rather startling: for it has become one of the main methods of 
normative ethics to treat (what are there called) our ‘moral intuitions’ as a kind of evidence, 
indeed in the restricted sense of this essay, for moral conclusions; and it supposed that we ought 
to adopt moral conclusions on the basis of the weight of the evidence.  Whereas if the 
considerations canvassed in this essay are sound, it would appear that adopting such a 
perspective on (what I would prefer to call) our spontaneous moral judgments dooms us to 
exactly the kind of skepticism which etiological worries threaten to bring down on moral 
realism.   
The problem could be put this way. To treat our moral intuitions as evidence is, in effect, 
to treat our moral faculties as a kind of black box—intuitions become the output of a machine we 
do not yet understand.  But in that case, the most obvious explanations that suggest themselves 
for such output will be causal, or etiological ones—explanations which do not appear to even be 
in the business of justifying those intuitions.40 In other words: treating our intuitions as evidence 
has the effect of casting justifications for those intuitions, on the one hand, and causal 
explanations, on the other, as in competition with each other; but the competition is rigged; the 
                                                 
39 This can perhaps happen irregularly: I am not myself very sure of what to say here, but perhaps the fact that this 
wise man believes that M is some evidence that M is true.  Following our schema, we must say that, if this is 
evidence, then there must be a mode of more direct epistemic access to the moral fact; but that will be just—seeing 
that M is true in light of the reasons for it.  There is still no such thing as brutely seeing some moral fact to be true.  
And it would remain true that moral knowledge could not be obtained through evidence.     
40 This possibility is exploited selectively by Singer 2005; for criticism, see Berker 2009.  
 31 
causal story will always emerge as the ‘better explanation’; and the rational support for these 
intuitions will appear to have been undermined.     
But whether or not these last speculations are on the right track, it appears, in any case, 
that moral realism, in and of itself, does not invite skepticism.  If the cost of avoiding such 
skepticism is indeed giving up on one method of moral theorizing that had, perhaps, little to 
recommend itself in the first place, then perhaps it is not too high.   
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2 MORAL TESTIMONY? 
 
1. The possibility of ‘moral testimony’ has recently become a topic of interest for moral 
philosophers.  The interest (such as there is) in the subject lies, plausibly, not only in the answers 
to such questions as “Can there be moral testimony?” and “When should we take it?”, but in the 
way such answers will ramify into moral epistemology more generally.  My own interests lie 
primarily in the latter; accordingly, my purpose in this paper will be try to get a purchase on 
some nagging questions in moral epistemology by way of considerations raised by the ‘moral 
testimony’ topic. 
The parties in the debate fall, broadly, into two camps: Optimists and Pessimists.41 The 
terms are, in one way, transparent—Optimists are for moral testimony (or sanguine about it) 
whereas Pessimists are against it (or skeptical of it)!—but in fact these terms obscure a mass of 
subtleties.  Thus, intuitively, an Optimist about moral testimony might be someone who believes 
that moral knowledge can be transmitted by testimony; whereas a Pessimist denies this.  But as 
Robert Hopkins42 uses the term, there is more than one way to be a Pessimist: for one can allow 
that moral knowledge is transmissible by testimony, but deny that it is (in Hopkins’s terms) 
                                                 
41 And, unlike in some debates, there are real, existing philosophers occupying each camp.  Jones 1995 and Driver 
2006 might be counted Optimists; Hills 2009 is a Pessimist; Hopkins 2007, from whom I borrow the terms, is 
studiedly neutral, but outlines what he takes to be the best strategy for the Pessimists; Nickel 2001 is a cautious 
Pessimist.  Anscombe 1981 is a less clear case.  But see below in the text for some clarification and qualification of 
the terms. 
42 Hopkins 2007, p. 613; as I say, I take the terms over from him. 
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usable; and thus still be a Pessimist.43  One difficulty (which Hopkins overlooks44) with such a 
terminology is that it seems possible, in fact, to deny that moral knowledge is transmitted by 
testimony, but to accept that what is transmitted is usable.45 Is such a philosopher an Optimist or 
a Pessimist? And further complications enter when we ask a Pessimist just why what is 
transmitted by testimony isn’t usable: for some theorists appear to think the difficulty is 
epistemic or quasi-epistemic; whereas others have held that the difficulty is specifically moral: 
one cannot act morally on something that one has acquired from testimony.46   
 Obviously the philosophical matter in the area swings free of any particular labeling 
scheme; in what follows I shall use the terms in the loose sense in which they were first 
introduced; but what is the philosophical matter? We can identify several, potentially 
independent questions: Is moral knowledge transmitted by moral testimony? Is what is 
transmitted by moral testimony ‘usable’ (in this way or that)? And: If what is transmitted is not 
usable, then why not? In some ways, the first question is the least interesting: we might take a 
terminological struggle over the word ‘knowledge’ to be as pointless as one over the words 
                                                 
43 This is, in fact, the strategy that Hopkins suggests that Pessimists adopt: see Hopkins 2009, p. 626 ff. Hopkins 
introduces a further complication which may be of some importance: a Pessimist, for him, is one who denies “the 
legitimacy of relying on another’s word in moral matters” (p. 613) unless it is unavoidable (see, e.g., p. 620-1)—for, 
Hopkins says, no one would deny that there are any occasions where we must take another’s word in moral matters: 
his go-to exception is: children learning morality from their parents (see, e.g., p. 612).  I say something about this 
below.   
44 The strategy of Hopkins’s paper suggests that he has simply missed this possibility: his suggestion, as we shall 
see, is that the Pessimist should hold that testimony transmits knowledge, but that that knowledge is not usable; the 
implication is that denying ‘usability’ is sufficient for Pessimism; is it necessary? Either way we go here seems to 
deprive the terms (Optimist and Pessimist) of some of their point.   
45 This is close to Jones’s position (although it’s clear where her heart is): she refrains from claiming that moral 
testimony transmits knowledge, but insists such testimony is, in any event, usable.   She gives a kind of 
impressionistic argument for the view that knowledge is so transmissible in a footnote, though I do not understand it 
(see fn. 32, p. 75). 
46 For the view that the difficulty is ‘epistemic or quasi-epistemic’ see Hills 2009; for the view that the problem 
stems from a requirement on acting morally see, e.g., Nickel 2001. 
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‘Optimist’ and ‘Pessimist’.47 The interesting question, it seems to me, is this: what does the 
testifier have that his auditor does not? Having answered that question, we shall be in a position, 
I think, to answer questions about what is transmissible and what is not; and of what is not, why 
not; and so on. 
  
2. Before turning to that question, one precautionary note is in order: there are all sorts of cases 
here; and they are not always well distinguished by the theorists.  Thus the questions about moral 
testimony are often asked à propos of some schema (which then undergoes complications), 
roughly, “Suppose someone tells someone else some moral proposition M; does the auditor 
acquire moral knowledge, and if not, what more is needed?” But there are all sorts of things 
which could be called a ‘moral proposition’; and it may be that very different answers are called 
for in the different cases. Just to take a few: moral propositions can be general (“Theft is 
wrong”) or specific (“This is wrong”); can introduce a new moral concept (“This is unchaste”) or 
attempt to subsume a new case under an old one (“Downloading music from the Internet is 
theft”); can make reference to the grounds for the judgment or be unadorned; and so on.48  Then 
too there are questions about whether testimony which introduces something pertinent to a moral 
judgment, but itself contains no ‘moral content’, is to count as moral testimony49; and just what 
‘containing moral content’ means.   
                                                 
47 Though it may be that, when the central questions are answered, we shall have no trouble deciding what to say.  
In the end, I offer a qualified defense of the claim that it is precisely moral knowledge that testimony cannot 
transmit. 
48 Indeed, it seems quite possible, prima facie, that the disagreements in the area could be sorted out by more finely 
distinguishing examples.  I don’t actually think that this is so; it would be in any case a rather boring philosophical 
treatment, consisting as it would in a long list of different cases, and the considerations attaching to each.  Although  
it may be that an allergy to the boring is an important philosophical handicap. 
49 See Hills 2009, fn. 1 p. 94. 
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 In what follows I shall try my best to be alive to such distinctions.  But my thought—or 
anyway, my pious hope—is that once we get clear on the central question—What does the 
testifier have that her auditor does not?—the answers to the subtleties will fall into place.  
Nevertheless, following tradition, my paradigm for a bit of moral testimony will be this: a 
particular claim invoking a thick moral term.50 
 
3. Now various reasons have been suggested for why moral testimony might either fail to 
transmit knowledge, or anyway fail to transmit something that the auditor can use: e.g., the 
seriousness of moral decisions; the putative (special) difficulties in identifying moral experts; the 
requirements of Kantian ‘autonomy’ (sometimes fuzzily classed as a kind of ‘inauthenticity’); 
the ‘practical’ nature of moral knowledge; the special connection between moral beliefs and 
character; the non-cognitivist nature of moral judgments; the non-propositional nature of moral 
judgments; and finally something vaguely described as a requirement that one ‘grasp the 
reasons’ for some judgment.  Some of these suggestions overlap; some cannot be held together 
with certain others; several are ambiguous, as stated.  In general, Optimists have tended to deny 
only some of these features, and to accept others; and to claim instead that these latter, 
admittedly special features of ethical judgment pose no special problem for testimony; or that, 
insofar as they pose a problem, they pose no problem for moral testimony in general, only 
particular occasions of testimony.51 
                                                 
50 Jones 1995’s example is (roughly), “This is sexism.”  See §3, below.  The example is picked up by Driver, Nickel, 
and Hills. 
51 Thus one, technically Optimistic strategy, has been to concede that moral testimony very often fails to transmit 
something that the auditor can use; but that this is a reflection, not of in principle difficulties with moral testimony, 
but just particular difficulties which happen to arise more often here, but needn’t.   Cf. Driver 2006. 
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 Here I think it will be useful to enter a distinction.  The ‘special features’ of the moral 
sphere, just mentioned, that have putative implications for moral testimony, can be classed into 
two kinds: on the one hand, we have the (supposedly) special features of moral judgment which 
cannot be passed on through testimony, and, not being transmissible, may (or may not) threaten 
the status of the auditor’s ‘information’ as either knowledge or anyway as usable (call these 
‘transmission-level factors’); and then we have the (putatively) special features of the moral 
sphere in general, which may themselves threaten the status of this information (‘non-
transmission-level factors’).  So, e.g., if the special ‘weightiness’ or ‘seriousness’ of moral 
matters is a problem for moral testimony, then this is not (obviously) a problem about 
transmission; whereas if the problem with moral testimony is that it can’t transmit the non-
cognitive element of a moral judgment, then this is, evidently, a transmission worry.  
Here, then, we encounter the curious fact that nearly all parties to the debate—Optimists 
and Pessimists alike—are united in holding that there is something which the testifier has, which 
the auditor does not, which is not transmissible.  Thus Karen Jones (an Optimist), employs as her 
paradigm of moral testimony a case in which a group of women reliably inform a male friend 
(‘Peter’) about the sexism of some third party, to which sexism Peter is blind.52  In her story, 
Peter never comes to see the sexism to which his friends advert; but, Jones contends, Peter ought 
to accept their testimony; and in fact act on it.53 Driver, another Optimist, also concedes that 
there is something which the testifier has which his auditor doesn’t, even after testimony; this 
                                                 
52 The name, ‘Peter’, is given by Jones.  In this paper I refrain from my usual habit of taking ‘Smith’ and ‘Jones’ as 
placeholders for names, in the first place because I have to talk about an actual philosopher named ‘Jones’; and in 
the second because, I am told, one makes himself ridiculous by talking about Smith and Jones.  En passant: for 
reasons we need not enter into here, Jones’s example produces in me precisely the opposite intuitions to those she 
means to elicit. 
53 Jones 1995 suggests, but doesn’t defend the claim, that Peter has hereby acquired moral knowledge; see fn. 45, 
above. 
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‘something’ she labels “super-knowledge” and “knowledge-plus.”54 Interestingly, Driver cashes 
out the distinction between that knowledge which is passed on by testimony, and that ‘super-
knowledge’ which is not, in terms of a distinction between evidence for a claim, and 
(appreciation of the) reasons for it.  I return to this point below. 
This is in one way all very unsurprising: the very idea of moral testimony turns on the 
idea that the testifier is in some kind of privileged (epistemic?) position.  In another way, though, 
this may seem quite surprising, since holding to such a view, while remaining an Optimist, 
entails holding, either that one can have moral knowledge without this special ‘something’, or 
anyway that one can ‘use’ testimony without it; or both.55 
 But a little reflection shows, I think, that this last is not surprising either.  For—
anticipating—if testimony is to be ‘testimony’, there will have to be something which is not 
passed on to the auditor; otherwise, what we should have is, not a case of one person ‘testifying 
to’ another—or: telling her something—but of one person getting another to see something; or 
getting her to appreciate something.  We can leave aside for the moment just what these terms 
(‘see’, ‘appreciate’) come to—indeed, what they come to is apparently (though not necessarily) 
just whatever the ‘something’ is which, in standard cases of moral testimony, the testifier has and 
the auditor lacks; so getting clear on the one will have to wait till we get clear on the other.   
 Now it may be that this way of dividing the terrain will appear to beg the question against 
the Optimist.  But as I have said, the Optimists themselves have tended to focus on cases where 
something—some kind of advantage—possessed by the testifier, isn’t passed on; and I think they 
have done so—rightly—through an appreciation (implicit or otherwise) that a case in which 
someone is gotten to see something is just not a case of moral testimony.   
                                                 
54 Driver 2006, p. 638.  These terms are apparently intended to be pejorative. 
55 And this is just the position of Driver and Jones. 
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For these reasons, in what follows, I mean to set aside, for as long as possible, the 
questions, both of whether or not moral testimony transmits knowledge; and of whether or not 
what is transmitted is ‘usable’.  Since everyone seems to agree that something is not passed on, 
the operative question is ‘what?’  The bulk of this essay will be an attempt to get clear on only 
this: What, exactly, is not passed on by moral testimony? That is: What are the ‘transmission-
level factors’? 
 Before resuming the main thread we might remark another case still, which, though it can 
be confused with the two cases just mentioned, is in fact rather clearly distinct: the case of moral 
training.  For although theorists of moral testimony sometimes claim that even hard-core 
Pessimists must accept some kind of moral testimony56, sc., the kind given by parents to 
children, the assimilation of this case to ‘testimony’ seems quite wrong.57 I mean just that it 
would be a gross distortion to imagine that what parents do, primarily, is merely to ‘tell’ their 
children various moral rules.  On the contrary, children must be trained to approve of this and be 
appalled at that; and no amount of mere telling could accomplish this training.  Nor is the case of 
training obviously the same thing as (what I’ve called) getting someone to see something; a fact 
which can be brought out, I think, at the intuitive level, if we reflect that we sometimes succeed 
in getting a peer to see or appreciate some moral fact; but we would not call that ‘training’ her.58      
 Perhaps the impression of having begged the question will have been strengthened, not 
allayed, by these last points; I mean in any case to support them in what follows.  But unless the 
prima facie distinction collapses, I think we should begin, then, by recognizing at least three 
different cases: mere testimony; getting someone to see something; and training. 
                                                 
56 Hopkins 2007, e.g., at p. 612; Hills 2009, p. 94. 
57 And indeed, if this bachelor may be so bold, would, if accepted, conduce to a rather bad style of parenting. 
58 Thus Anscombe has sometimes been taken for an Optimist; but the subject of her 1981 appears to be moral 
training, not testimony. 
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4. Now as I say, the Optimists largely concede that something is not passed on; and this brings 
them rather close to the apparent Pessimists (and their would-be defenders).  Thus Robert 
Hopkins advises Pessimists to abandon the strategy of denying that moral testimony transmits 
moral knowledge, and to claim, instead, that such knowledge is not ‘usable’—and unusable 
precisely because of what is not passed on.  In particular, he suggests the following, plausible, if 
rather vague, “Requirement”: “having the right to a moral belief requires one to grasp the moral 
grounds.”59  
The difficult question, which Hopkins does not address, is just how to unpack ‘having the 
right’ and ‘grasp the moral grounds’.60  These phrases are hardly ‘metaphors’ (dead metaphors, 
perhaps); but in the present context, it is not quite clear what they come to.  An understanding of 
the former is essential if we are to discover just what it would be wrong to do with this (putative) 
moral knowledge: may I, e.g., pass the testimony on to someone else? And if not, what is the 
penalty I shall incur in doing so?  
But the second phrase—‘grasp the moral grounds’—is, if anything, more essential.  
Indeed, it is our quarry.  Of course, we are all familiar with the (quasi-metaphorical) use of the 
expression ‘to grasp...’; but difficulties rush in as soon as we give the obvious answers.   
Thus Hopkins deploys his Requirement as the upshot of a discussion in which having 
moral grounds for some moral proposition is contrasted with having ‘Humean’ grounds for the 
truth of that proposition.  Humean grounds, for Hopkins, include such considerations as ‘that 
everyone believes m’; ‘that this guy who’s telling me m is generally reliable’; ‘that he is 
                                                 
59 Hopkins 2007, p. 630, emphasis original. 
60 I mean no criticism of Hopkins: he forwards his Requirement at the end as a gift for future Pessimists, to be 
worked out by them. 
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presently being sincere’; and so on; and Hopkins characterizes ‘Humean’ considerations as 
“reasons, available to the recipient of testimony, for thinking that what she is told is true.”61  
This strikes me as a rather vague formulation.  After all, if the recipient of the testimony 
is told, in addition to the (putative) fact that Φing is wrong, the further fact that, “It is wrong 
because of R,” where R is some moral reason, then, by the letter of this definition, R should be 
counted among the Humean reasons; but this evidently destroys the contrast we wanted to 
understand.62  Now we might think to get a purchase on the distinction—between Humean 
grounds and moral grounds—from the other side: Humean grounds for a moral distinction will 
then just be all admissible grounds that are not moral grounds.  I actually think that this will not 
do either, for reasons which will, I hope, emerge below.  Suffice it to say for now that the 
relevant distinction in the area, as I see it, also holds between ‘Humean grounds’—that is, what I 
should like to call ‘evidence’—and certain non-moral reasons—‘grounds’, in my terminology.  
We can get some idea of the distinction, I think, if we note that the ‘Humean’ method of 
reasoning outlined by Hopkins is, in effect, a form of inference to the best explanation; 
whereas—as I shall try to show below—it would be a serious mistake to think that enumerating 
(e.g.) moral grounds for a moral ‘proposition’ constituted an exercise in inference to the best 
explanation.  My preferred way of putting the point is this: X is ‘evidence’ for Y if and only if 
there is some more direct mode of access to the fact (Y), which mode is currently unavailable; 
where ‘grounds’ for Y presuppose no such thing.  Then too, I think we can get some sense of the 
distinction by asking ourselves this question: In which case, when we mean to query someone’s 
                                                 
61 Ibid, p. 627. 
62 This possibility—of being told the moral reasons by the testifier—just appears to be off Hopkins’s radar, a point I 
return to below.  In saying this I again do not mean to disparage his careful, patient paper: his interest is just 
elsewhere. 
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claim, do we ask, “How do you know?” and in which cases do we ask, “Why?” But I hope to 
make this clearer in what follows. 
At the moment, the important point is just this: if Hopkins’s suggestion is right, then what 
the testifier has, and his auditor lacks, even after the testimony has been given, is a grasp of the 
moral grounds.63  But we should immediately add that this ‘grasp’, whatever it is, cannot be 
passed on, from testifier to auditor, merely by more testimony: that is, someone’s telling me (in 
addition to some moral fact) ‘the moral grounds’ for some moral proposition (“Φing is wrong”), 
does not suffice to give me a ‘grasp’ of those reasons.64 This comes out, I think, if we reflect on 
the intuitive fact that merely being able to rehearse the grounds for some claim is just not the 
same thing as ‘grasping’ them.  Thus—anticipating—to take an aesthetic example, if I am told 
(say) that “This symphony is a masterpiece” on the grounds (in part) that it “employs a dramatic 
use of chromatics in the bass,” I have evidently been given the (aesthetic) proposition and its 
(aesthetic) grounds; I might even go so far as to (fraudulently?) repeat this to someone else; but it 
seems clear that my ability to rehearse such facts is no guarantee that I actually grasp the 
grounds, in some intuitive sense of that phrase.  Of course, we need more than an intuitive sense; 
in what follows I try to accomplish that.  The present point is just that ‘being in possession of’ 
the grounds for some claim is, intuitively, not sufficient for grasping them.   
 
                                                 
63 The implicit identification here—between what the auditor lacks and what the testifier has in virtue of which he 
can testify—is licit, given Hopkins’s formulation: surely what’s included in ‘has a right to’ is ‘may testify to the 
effect that’. 
64 I put ‘the moral grounds’ in scare-quotes because I myself am skeptical that there is some canonical set of 
propositions (reasons, whatever) which are the grounds for some moral proposition.  Some of the reasons for my 
suspicion will come out below, but I try to argue for this claim, in different ways, in Chapter 3. 
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5. Why not? Alison Hills tries to answer this question in a recent Pessimistic discussion of moral 
testimony.65 Hills (like Hopkins) is willing to concede that moral knowledge may be transmitted 
by testimony, but she insists that something else—sc., moral understanding—is not.66  
 Now Hills is sensitive to the fact, just mentioned, that, whatever ‘grasping’ or 
‘appreciating’ some moral reason is, it must be distinguished from (what I have called) merely 
being able to rehearse the reasons—from merely ‘believing’ them, as Hills says.67  One needs, 
further, “a grasp of the relation between a moral proposition and the reasons why it’s true.” This 
seems right, but is hardly an advance: the mysterious ‘grasp’ shows up here again.  We need 
some further analysis.  Hills’s own account goes by way of counterfactual dependence; and in 
spite of my general sympathy for Hills’s view, I don’t think the account works.   
Thus Hills claims that, if (say) Judith merely tells Claire that m (“Φing is wrong”) 
because of R, then Claire’s belief that Φing is wrong counterfactually depends, not on R—
though Claire, ex hypothesi, believes it—but rather on “what Judith says.”68 Intuitively, this is 
not correct: we needn’t choose between the two.  Thus if, e.g., Claire was set to murder her 
neighbor for his car, and refrains after being told, by Judith, that “It would be wrong to kill him” 
                                                 
65 Hills 2009. 
66 ‘Moral understanding’, then, plays the role for Hills that ‘grasping the moral grounds for’ plays for Hopkins—
indeed, Hills appears to identify the two at various points in her paper: see, e.g., p. 100; p. 101, where Hills speaks 
of ‘appreciating the reason why’ rather than ‘grasping’; p. 127; etc.; see her fn. 8, p. 98, for an acknowledgement of 
the kinship between her views and Hopkins’s.   
Nevertheless, Hills attempts to elucidate ‘moral understanding’ by way of a list of abilities which are individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient (or something like it: see her fn. 19, p. 103: “These abilities are, I think, individually 
necessary for moral understanding, and I suspect they may be jointly sufficient....”).  The relevant features include 
the ability to: follow an explanation for some moral proposition, m; explain why m in one’s own words; draw the 
conclusion m from the reason, R; draw similar conclusions on the basis of similar grounds; etc. (See p. 102.)  But 
she leaves it open whether or not these abilities are, together, constitutive of (‘identical with’) moral understanding, 
or merely symptoms of it (see fn. 18, p. 102).  I am broadly sympathetic to Hills’s view; the present paper can be 
taken as an attempt to rectify some (putative) missteps in her argument; and to suggest that these abilities are, in 
fact, reflections of something we can characterize more directly. 
67 ‘Believing’ the reasons, for Hills, means: having been told them by someone one finds reliable; sincere; etc.  That 
is: ‘believing’ the reasons for the same ‘Humean’ reasons that one might ‘believe’ testimony about the original 
moral fact.  Whether this deserves the name ‘belief’ might be disputed, but it hardly matters here. 
68 See p. 111, fn. 29; “what Judith says” is evidently to be taken in a de dicto sense. 
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because (say) “It’s wrong to take the life of an innocent”; and furthermore Claire ‘believes’ both 
propositions (say, on the basis of her estimation of Judith’s ‘reliability’); then there is clearly 
some sense in which Claire’s belief (“It would be wrong to kill him”) is counterfactually 
dependent on her belief that “It’s wrong to take the life of an innocent”—e.g., we should be 
inclined to say this, I take it, just in case Claire would have gone ahead with the murder if she 
had learned that her neighbor was not ‘innocent’.  Of course it’s no doubt true that Claire’s 
having the belief—that ‘it’s wrong to take the life of an innocent’—is further dependent on 
Judith’s having told her; but to suppose that the latter was, therefore, the ‘true’ or ‘real’ 
explanation of Claire’s action, seems no more justified than to suppose that the ‘true’ explanation 
of Claire’s action was, in fact, Judith’s having been born, since, that having failed to have 
happened, Claire would not have acted as she did.    
 The last argument is rather compressed.  The general point is this: it will not in general do 
to say, of someone who ostensibly Φs for reason R, that R was not her reason, just because she 
would not have believed R if something else hadn’t happened.  This can be shown in another 
way, when we consider that ‘learning to appreciate that it would be wrong to do such-and-such 
on the grounds that such-and-such-else’ is, as far as Hills’s proposed counterfactual test goes, in 
just the same position as ‘coming to believe that m, and that R is the reason for m’.  And these 
were precisely the two sorts of situations we had wanted to distinguish.69 A counterfactual 
analysis does not appear to cut at the right joints.70 
                                                 
69 My own view is that explanations of this kind are infected by a contextual, pragmatic element; so that just what 
counts as ‘the reason she Φed’ depends on contextual factors: roughly, what elements of the situation are being held 
constant by one’s interlocutor; see Chapter 3.    
70 A similar problem affects Hills’s example of ‘Ron’ on pp. 114-15.  Adapting a case from Nomy Arpaly, Hills 
presents the following example (which sounds distinctly like the set-up for a joke): Ron is considering killing 
Tamara; he asks his rabbi about it, and his rabbi tells him that he oughtn’t do it, since Tamara is a person.  Ron 
knows that his rabbi is reliable and trustworthy; therefore, Ron comes to believe that he oughtn’t kill Tamara, and 
that the reason he oughtn’t is that Tamara is a person.  Now, this is just the sort of situation that Hills—and I—want 
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Then just what is involved in ‘grasping the grounds’? I want, in fact, to postpone 
discussion of just what this comes to until after exploring an alternate suggestion for what is 
required for moral understanding.  The suggestion is, roughly, that the basic requirement in the 
area—in one sense of ‘basic’—is the ability to recognize an action (or situation, or etc.) as falling 
under some moral predicate.  And that, though ‘grasping the reasons’ is also essential, it is, in 
one way, dependent on and logically posterior to the requirement just mentioned. 
 
6. Aesthetic analogies are often useful when discussing ethics, since, it is widely recognized, 
there are a number of parallels between the two domains.  On the other hand, just these parallels 
entail strict limits on the dialectical usefulness of such analogies, insofar as intuitions about both 
kinds of case will often align.71 
Nevertheless, I think the following sort of case may be helpful to consider, in part 
because of the disanalogies between ethics and aesthetics.  Take, then, the case of ‘movie 
judgments’.  Just what makes a good film is a complicated, and no doubt controverted thing; 
still, we are probably all familiar with such judgments, having made many ourselves.  So, 
                                                                                                                                                             
to distinguish from the case of genuine ‘moral understanding’; and Hills attempts to explain why this doesn’t count 
as truly ‘appreciating the reason’ by way of a counterfactual analysis; she writes: “Ron’s belief [that it would be 
wrong to kill Tamara] is...counterfactually dependent on the rabbi’s testimony...together with his [Ron’s] belief that 
the rabbi is trustworthy and reliable, but not counterfactually dependent on his [Ron’s] belief that Tamara is a 
person” (see p. 116, fn. 38). But as it seems to me, in order to elicit the intuition that Ron’s belief is indeed 
counterfactually dependent on “his belief that Tamara is a person,” all we have to do is consider what Ron would do 
if he came to believe (mirabile dictu) that Tamara was not a person; presumably, he would kill her.  (I.e., he would 
come to believe, “It would not be wrong to kill Tamara.”)  The only way, I take it, to block this intuition is to insist, 
as Hills does later in the same footnote, that Ron would have believed something different (about whether or not he 
could kill Tamara) if he had been told something different by his rabbi.  True, no doubt.  But just as Ron’s belief (“It 
would be wrong to kill Tamara”) depends on ‘what the rabbi told him’, what the rabbi told him depends on further 
things—say, what is written in the Law.  Shall we say, then, that ‘what the rabbi told him’ isn’t part of the relevant 
explanation either? (In general, we cannot insist that X is not counterfactually dependent on Y, just because Y is, in 
turn, counterfactually dependent on Z. ) 
71 Driver 2006, interestingly, also considers the analogy between ethics and aesthetics; her conclusion is, roughly, 
that the same general considerations do indeed apply to both domains; but that the special reluctance we have in 
accepting moral testimony is to be chalked up to a) the greater seriousness of moral matters and b) the relative (to 
aesthetics) difficulty of becoming a moral expert (i.e., to non-transmission-level factors); nevertheless, there is 
nothing in principle wrong with moral testimony.  For what it’s worth, (b) seems exactly backwards to me. 
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consider the case in which I see some movie with a friend; afterwards, I sing its praises, whereas 
he found it (say) thoroughly insipid.  We can imagine the kinds of things he will say if he wants 
to convince me of its demerits.  Now many of these things he may have noticed—in the sense of: 
become consciously aware of—while watching the movie; but others he need not have.  Indeed, 
it is quite common—I find—when we’ve disliked (or liked) some film, to find ourselves hard-
pressed to explain just what made it bad (or good).72 My friend’s initial reaction may have been, 
for example, wincing at some scene; only later, when trying to convince me, does he manage to 
articulate his complaint: the scene was (say) sentimentalist, in the pejorative sense of that term.73   
The first point I should like to underline, then, is this: that it may be quite difficult to 
articulate one’s reasons; my friend might, in fact, fail entirely to articulate them; and yet for all 
that, he might be quite right in his judgment.  Now, according to one plausible line of thought, if 
someone is never able to articulate the reasons for his judgments, such judgments do not amount 
to aesthetic judgments at all—indeed, they do not amount to judgments.  Whether or not this is 
so can be dropped for the moment.  If we imagine my friend to be, generally, able to articulate 
the reasons for his judgment, then his inability here will hardly jeopardize the status of his 
current judgment.74        
But this—familiar—inability, or anyway difficulty, in articulating one’s reasons opens 
the way for a further important point about aesthetic judgment, a point which can be brought into 
relief by considering a bad picture of such judgments.  Thus it is sometimes thought—by 
                                                 
72 In fact, the case of trying to convince someone that some movie, or book, or whatever, was good, is notoriously 
more difficult than trying to persuade someone that it was bad, which is one reason why I’ve chosen this form for 
the analogy.  Just why this is, is an interesting question—connected, perhaps, to the old wisdom, bonum ex integra 
causa, malum ex quocumque defectu.  One thing we may do here, though, is try to defuse criticisms 
73 Cf. McDowell 1979.  
74 I myself am not sure I buy this ‘familiar line of thought’.  There may be other ways to distinguish ‘mere reaction’ 
(or whatever) from ‘genuine aesthetic judgment’: for example, by way of the notion of ‘tutored’ and ‘untutored’ 
judgments; or ‘well-trained’ vs. ‘untrained’ vs. ‘warped’ sensibilities.  
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philistines, I suppose—that what the good critic does is, in effect, test the film against some set 
of criteria for being a good movie; and thus what being a good critic consists in is knowing 
what’s on this list.  The critic then (on this view) may even ignore his own ‘spontaneous 
judgment’, deferring, as he must, to the list.  That, as I say, is the philistine’s view (I have heard 
it more or less expressed); and the philistine for this reason rejects the authority of the critic as 
basically fraudulent.  Presented with the critic’s judgment, and the reasons for that judgment—
i.e., a deployment of some of the items on the list—the philistine responds, “What do I care 
about your list? I like what I like.” 
Not that everyone with such a picture of aesthetic judgment might respond this way; the 
snob, we might say, is one who shares this view of aesthetic criticism with the philistine, but 
actually embraces the critic’s judgment: all he wants is to find out what’s on the list—to join the 
club.75 
Now no doubt there are many fraudulent critics.  But if there is such a thing as a good 
one, then the difference must be something like this: what comes first for him, is the judgment of 
the movie’s quality; he then articulates why: these are his reasons.  If these reasons occur over 
and over—as plausibly they will—then they could indeed be put on a ‘list’ of criteria.  (If they 
can be codified—i.e., if they can be put in the form of unqualified ‘if...then’ statements—then a 
system of ‘aesthetic rules’ is possible.  This seems distinctly less plausible.)  But what seems 
essential is that he recognize the movie as good; and that this recognition in some sense precedes 
the reasons he gives.76  
                                                 
75 This illustration of a defective picture of aesthetic judgment was impressed on me by Jack Fortune. 
76 This picture is impossibly crude, but the relevant qualifications would take us too far afield.  One such 
qualification would be that the critic’s judgments would surely be much more determinate than ‘good’: it may be, 
e.g., ‘a moving drama’, or whatever.   
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In what sense? Well, at least in this sense, evidently, if the philistine really is wrong: the 
reasons the critic gives must be attempts to articulate his spontaneous judgment.77  For, if our 
intuition above was sound, then merely rehearsing the reasons—e.g., in the absence of a genuine 
spontaneous judgment to the effect that the film was good—will evince a kind of fraudulence—
or in any case, will be a kind of ‘mere parroting’.  So, one condition on the rehearsal of some set 
of reasons counting as ‘an attempt to articulate one’s judgment’ is, naturally enough, that one 
have made such a judgment.  There may be others.   
Does the reverse hold? Is there, that is, a kind of logical dependence of forming a 
spontaneous (genuine aesthetic) judgment on one’s giving (or: being able to give) reasons for 
that judgment? As I noted, there is a familiar line of thought according to which a general 
inability to give reasons for one’s judgment would undercut the entitlement to call such things 
‘judgments’: they would be, in effect, a kind of exclamation of pleasure.78  But even if we 
endorse this line, it seems clear that the inability to articulate one’s reasons in a particular 
instance does not, by itself, undermine the status of that judgment.  So: if forming a spontaneous 
judgment and being able to articulate one’s reasons are both conditions on ‘having aesthetic 
understanding’ (as we can now say), then nevertheless there is an asymmetry between the two 
conditions.   
 
7. Let’s return to our story.  What I want to suggest now, on the strength of the foregoing, is that, 
for my friend’s deprecations of the film to be expressions of—what we can call, with no 
prejudice to the question of how such ‘understanding’ might be used—aesthetic understanding, 
and not merely some affected snobbery, what he says must be expressions of—in fact, attempts 
                                                 
77 And whether or not they constitute such an attempt should be a logical matter, not a psychological one. 
78 Cf. Wittgenstein, “Lectures on Aesthetics,” esp. §17, in Barrett 1967. 
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to articulate—a spontaneous judgment.  In the absence of such a spontaneous judgment, the film 
may still be sentimentalist trash, but he doesn’t understand that (or why).79 To say this is of 
course not to deny that his words may nevertheless have the effect of spoiling the film for me—
indeed, they may do so even if the movie was, as a matter of fact, quite good.80 
Supposing though that he is no fraud, our proxy question will be: What does he give me 
when he gives me his reasons why the movie was bad? In the best case, he gets me to see what 
he sees.  But if the foregoing thoughts were sound, this doesn’t mean that he gets me to (say) 
‘see’ that swelling strings were played over the funeral scene (a fact I may indeed have missed), 
and to accept that that kind of thing is sentimentalist.  What he’s trying to do is to get me to see 
the movie (or that part of it) as sentimentalist in virtue of the swelling strings; i.e., he’s trying to 
get me to share his judgment, and his tools are the various features.  A little lyrically, we might 
say: he’s trying to get me to stand in the right place, in order to see the thing in the right light.81  
 
8. Now in the first place, if the analogy is sound, then our tentative conclusion will be that, in the 
ethical case, what fails to be transmitted by mere testimony is just this: a spontaneous (ethical) 
judgment.  But here we should enter another qualification, since it will not always be obvious 
whether or not someone’s utterance really does constitute a ‘spontaneous moral judgment’.  One 
temptation here is to appeal some introspectible quality of the spontaneous judgment, but I think 
that should be resisted: following tradition, I think we should say that my spontaneous moral 
                                                 
79 None of this is to deny that it may be necessary, on the way to earning genuine aesthetic sensitivity, that one 
should first spend some time practicing, as it were, getting into the judgment.  Just why one should be inclined to do 
this is a further, delicate question 
80 In general, it’s a lot easier to criticize than it is to appreciate. 
81 But here too it’s worth saying that standing in some place can probably destroy the appreciation of any aesthetic 
object: seeing early drafts of the novel; finding out biographical details of the artist; and so on.  There may always 
be some position from which we can (as it were) see the seams. 
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judgment is indeed a genuine one just in case I am able, in future cases, to make similar 
judgments—to ‘go on’ with (say) the relevant thick moral term.82  
And though nothing I have said so far demonstrates it, it seems to me that, insofar as we 
think that the fraudulence, exhibited by someone who (as we can vaguely say) ‘makes use of’ an 
aesthetic judgment he really does not understand, is exactly parallel to the ‘inauthenticity’, or 
whatever we choose to call it, in the case of someone making use of a moral judgment he does 
not understand, then I think we shall further think that it is this, and not, e.g., the weightiness of 
moral judgments, or the difficulty in finding specifically moral experts, that is driving our 
discomfort with moral testimony.  Though this is not to say that the native seriousness of moral 
judgments doesn’t have some important consequences; and here we see the importance of 
understanding just what ‘having a right to’ comes to (see §4, above).  So, for example, one way I 
might ‘make use of’ someone’s aesthetic judgment (about a film, say), is to go see the movie 
myself; and obviously there’s nothing fraudulent here.  Just as surely, there are cases where we 
blamelessly take another’s word on moral matters: if someone tells me that (say) sitting in this 
seat (on the 71A) is terribly wrong or deeply unfair, and I don’t see it at all, surely it would be a 
little hysterical to call my moving to another seat three feet over ‘inauthentic’ or otherwise 
troubling; or even, I think, to insist that I would be ‘within my rights’ to keep my seat: when the 
consequences are trivial enough, the moral claim serious enough, and the testifier basically 
trustworthy, it seems plausible to say that I ought to just ‘make use of’ the testimony, and act.   
Perhaps this will be disputed; it is in any case not my main concern.  My concern, at the 
moment, is this question: is this phenomenon local to these two kinds of case, moral and 
                                                 
82 Cf. McDowell 1979, 1981.  This chimes, too, with Hills’s suggestion that one criterion for ‘moral understanding’ 
is drawing similar conclusions in similar cases (see p. 102); see also her Wittgensteinian-themed footnote 19, p. 103: 
she too disparages the idea that the achievement of moral understanding can be recognized by “certain sorts of 
feeling: a flash of enlightenment; a light dawning.”  
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aesthetic? I noted before that the two spheres are often classed together—plausibly, since, 
whatever else is involved, sentiment or feeling is evidently at play in both aesthetic and moral 
judgments.  (Or anyway it has been widely supposed.) On the other side, we have cases of 
‘normal empirical judgments’, like, “She’s in the next room,” which appear to pose no parallel 
difficulties for testimony.  Is this the relevant line then, with empirical judgments on one side, 
and ethical and aesthetic judgments on the other? 
I am not so sure that it is.  Imagine a man who was born and raised on a desert island; 
somehow, he speaks English.  Upon his being brought to civilization, we attempt to teach him 
the names of various artifacts, naturally not found on desert islands; but he has some trouble with 
the concept ‘chair’.  Our attempts at getting him to recognize them are in vain.  Perhaps I point 
out to him a chair, identify it.  He asks, “Why is that a chair?” I give him the stock reasons: 
arms, back, seat, etc.  And yet he cannot consistently use the term; he calls all sorts of non-chair 
things ‘chair’ and vice versa. (Perhaps at some point he tries to sit on my lap: “But you have 
arms, back, and a seat!” he complains.) Of course, any particular chair, having been identified by 
him, will pose no special problems: he will be able to say of it that it is a chair; he may even go 
on to rehearse the reasons (say, to some third party), perhaps quite convincingly: “Oh, you know, 
it has arms, a back, a seat.” Shall we say he knows that it’s a chair (on the basis of my 
testimony)? It again seems to me entirely indifferent how we answer that question; perhaps he 
can even ‘use’ the information (someone asks for a chair, and he brings it).  But it does seem to 
me that what he lacks, in this case, is parallel to what someone lacks in the cases of moral and 
aesthetic testimony.  –Parallel, but not the same, since, for one thing, this man’s deficit is not just 
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an inability to apply the concept (‘chair’) in particular cases, but a failure to grasp the concept 
altogether.  What he lacks is the ability to make genuine, spontaneous chair-judgments.83   
A man who doesn’t know what chairs are, and has a conspicuously hard time learning it, 
is perhaps a little hard to imagine.  I use the example because it brings to light what I think is an 
important feature of these cases, sc., our inability to specify individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for the application of the concept.  For it is a notorious fact that doing so for 
the concept ‘chair’ is impossible.  This last feature is a little less clear (since I hardly know how 
to use the terms myself) in the following example, which is in other ways easier to imagine: 
someone who (say) can’t tell the difference between a sofa and a settee.  Here too we can 
imagine someone who can profit by being told (e.g.) that this is a sofa; but to whom we should 
hardly award control of the concept, insofar as he can’t tell the two apart, quite generally.  He 
cannot, again, make spontaneous sofa-judgments.   
On the other hand, insofar as the reasons, or grounds, for some judgment do constitute 
necessary and sufficient conditions for that judgment—and these grounds, or ‘features’, are 
themselves understood by the auditor—then I think our worries about testimony evaporate 
(here).  For if there is (e.g.) some one feature that distinguishes sofas and settees (I have no idea 
myself), then I think that we shall say that he learns what a (say) sofa is by being given the 
reason.  Here, ‘being in possession of’ the grounds and ‘grasping them’ are the same.84 85 
                                                 
83 And note that there is something distinctly off-key about the phrase “evidence that this is a chair,” said of 
someone who’s (say) looking at a chair.  I should note here, too, that though, in this example, our man lacks the 
concept ‘chair’ altogether, the point carries over, so far as I can see, to situations where someone merely doesn’t 
know how to apply the term in some more limited class of cases.  See below in the text.   
84 Of course, the auditor will have to be able to reliably identify the feature; and, in this example, anyway, be able to 
(as we could put it) use the disjunctive predicate ‘is a sofa or a settee’.  I don’t think these complications affect the 
main argument.   
85 But here I am decidedly less sure.  The difficulty is this: there is some kind of intuitive introspective difference—
perhaps illusory for all that—between my seeing, on the basis of some individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
criteria, that something is an X; and my seeing immediately that something is an X, though the conditions for being 
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9. If this is right, then one reason that moral testimony—“That was sexist”—is insufficient for 
transmitting genuine moral understanding is that such testimony—even when accompanied by 
further testimony to the effect that this and that are the reasons for the judgment—does not 
guarantee that one can go on using the term; and this in turn, I want to suggest, is because such 
terms cannot be given necessary and sufficient conditions for their application.  That is: whatever 
reasons we give for the judgment, they only entail their conclusion (the judgment itself) when 
supplied with a ceteris paribus clause.  Or again: the judgment goes ‘beyond’ any of the reasons 
we could enumerate; and so (merely) relating those reasons does not guarantee that the auditor 
has picked up the concept.86     
None of this is to say that all cases of moral testimony involve an auditor who has little or 
no grasp of a concept; indeed, I noted at the outset that there are all kinds of cases; and in a 
longer discussion, they too would be treated, and perhaps quite differently.  But all the cases 
imagined by the theorists either are87 or can be massaged into88 cases where what the auditor 
lacks is the ability to apply some thick moral term either altogether, or anyway in some class of 
cases.   
Is this the only reason that moral testimony is insufficient to transmit moral 
understanding? I’m not sure myself just what to say here.  Intuitively, being able to apply and 
reapply some concept is not sufficient for ‘moral understanding’ since—it seems—what is 
required in addition is at least that I share (roughly) the attitude of the testifier.  If, for example, 
                                                                                                                                                             
an X are in this way enumerable, and moreover, open to my view.  But whatever ‘non-inferential’ knowledge is, it 
should not be something which is distinguished by introspection. 
86 This is my proposed substitute, in effect, for Hills’s counterfactual analysis.  My thought is the ‘ability to go on’ is 
one condition on some apparent spontaneous moral judgment in fact being such a judgment. 
87 Jones’s example of Peter and sexism (adopted by Driver, Hills, and Hopkins); Hills’s discussion of lying; etc.  
88 Driver’s story of ‘unjustified killing’; Hopkins’s discussion of workers contemplating a strike; Nickel’s case of 
killing in self-defense; etc. 
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Peter is presented with all sorts of cases, and he reliably discriminates between cases of sexism 
and cases of (say) reasonable discrimination on the basis of sex, nevertheless it seems rather odd 
to say that he’s acquired the concept if he doesn’t see the cases of sexism as (in some sense) bad.  
Whether such a thing is even possible is not entirely obvious.89 In the first place we should have 
to get clear on just what ‘see as bad’ meant.  I suppose, at a minimum, this would mean that 
Peter tries himself not to behave in these ways; and discourages it in others; etc.  Could Peter 
reliably make the judgments but not do these things? This seems dimly imaginable; but it does 
seem right to deny that Peter, in this case, was making the relevant spontaneous judgments.   
But in any case a decision here can be left in abeyance since, for my purposes, what is 
important is that the ability to use the term in novel cases should be a necessary condition on 
making a genuine moral judgment.  And that this is so is shown, I think—if the foregoing has 
been accepted—by the fact that if (what’s again only dimly imaginable) Peter acquires, by way 
of a bit of testimony, the relevant attitude towards some instance of sexist behavior, it 
nevertheless seems rather wrong to say of him that his judgment amounts to a genuine judgment 
that something is sexist if he cannot identify new examples of sexism in the future.      
My view, then, in effect, is this: what’s basic to moral understanding is having a 
spontaneous moral judgment about some situation, real or imagined, in sight or described.  But 
one of the conditions on some judgment’s being a genuine moral judgment is that I can ‘go on’; 
and this is most clearly seen in the case of command of some thick moral term.  It may be that a 
further condition is that I share the ‘attitude’ of the testifier; indeed, this is plausible.  But ‘being 
able to give the reasons’ for one’s judgment is in one way secondary: whereas rehearsing the 
reasons for some moral claim, in the absence of a genuine spontaneous judgment, does not 
                                                 
89 Compare Driver’s discussion of Satan as “an expert in [moral] judgment” (2006, p.630) but one that turns out to 
be, for rather different reasons (“Father of Lies,” and so on), rather unreliable.      
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amount to moral understanding at all; on the other hand, at least some cases of spontaneous 
moral judgments do count as displays of moral understanding, even if one can not rehearse the 
reasons for the judgment; though it may be that a general inability to rehearse the reasons would 
threaten the status of those judgments.   
 
10. What then of moral testimony and moral knowledge? I have urged—with everyone else—
that something is not passed on in moral testimony, some ‘moral understanding’; and I have tried 
to get a little clearer on what it is.  My suggestion, then, is that the uneasiness that Pessimists feel 
about moral testimony derives from this.  But can moral knowledge be passed on by testimony?  
It may be that all that remains now is a terminological struggle.  Nevertheless, I should 
like to close by offering a sketch of a view that a Pessimist might take. 
Thus in adopting the kind of picture I have, I appear to be implicitly asserting something 
explicitly denied by, e.g., Hopkins and Driver: both insist that moral knowledge is propositional 
knowledge, and not ‘knowledge-how’.  Hopkins’s argument, against moral ‘know-how’, is 
this90: in the first place it is quite clear that, if we reject non-cognitivism, then we must concede 
that there are moral beliefs, the truth or falsity of which we care about: moral propositions.  
Now, even if one conceded that ‘knowledge-how’ can be somehow characterized as belief-like, 
such beliefs would in any case not be ‘beliefs’ that are measured against a standard of truth.  It is 
therefore implausible that moral knowledge is knowledge-how.     
Now if my own suggestions are on the right track, then there is something, a kind of 
‘moral understanding’, which is in effect a kind of ‘know-how’: non-propositional knowledge of 
                                                 
90 See pp. 618-20. 
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how to use certain concepts.91  But to say this is not yet to enter the target area of Hopkins’s 
argument.  However: while I myself have tried to avoid the question of whether testimony can 
transmit moral knowledge, nevertheless if some Pessimist, with a view like mine, wanted to 
assert this, presumably what she would say is (something like) this:  
Nothing that we acquire from testimony could be counted as moral knowledge if it was not 
accompanied by the kind of know-how implied in being able to use certain concepts; and thus 
though there is moral knowledge which is propositional (“Their behavior was sexist”), one 
condition on (counting as) having such knowledge is prior possession of a kind of know-how.   
The possibility of such a view shows that Hopkins’s argument, as it stands, doesn’t work: 
he just does not consider the possibility that there might be some condition on having some 
propositional knowledge, which condition is itself not communicable by way of testimony 
(whether that further condition consist in ‘know-how’ or something else).  And this opens the 
way for a Pessimist to assert that, after all, what’s wrong with moral testimony is its inability to 
transmit moral knowledge, and not anything about the ‘usability’ of that knowledge.92  
 
                                                 
91 Hills’s view is similarly sympathetic to ‘ethical know-how’; but she declines to “press” the point: see p. 105.  In 
likening possession of moral concepts to ‘know-how’ I am drawing on the (putative) fact that they can’t be given 
necessary and sufficient conditions for their application; though cf. fn. 45. 
92 Driver’s arguments against ‘moral know-how’ has, I think, parallel problems. 
 56 
3 JUSTIFICATION IN CONTEXT 
 
1. My topic in the following pages is what would naturally be called ‘moral justification’.  That 
term, however, is ambiguous in a number of ways, and so some qualifications are in order. 
The kind of ‘moral justification’ I am interested in is the kind that would be given in 
response to (what we could call) the ‘How-could-you-do-that?’ ‘Why?’.  Here, some action is 
queried in such a way that, if no compelling response can be given, it will be understood that the 
agent has done something morally wrong—has offended against the moral law, or the virtues, or 
some such thing.  If some appropriate response is given, then we shall say that the agent has 
‘justified himself’ or ‘was morally justified’ in what he did. 
Now it is a familiar fact from epistemology that, at least in one sense of the word 
‘justified’, one could be justified in believing p, and yet p be false.  This sense of ‘to be justified’ 
is sometimes glossed as, roughly, ‘to have jumped through the necessary hoops; that is, done all 
that is reasonably required to find out whether p’.  ‘Justification’ in its moral sense, however, is 
most often used to mean not just ‘to have jumped through the right hoops’, but also ‘to have 
done the right thing’.  This departure is interesting.  Is there an analogue, in the moral realm, to 
the epistemological ‘justified, but wrong’? Here I think we have to admit that people talk in 
rather different ways about such scenarios, and it’s not clear just what to say.  Perhaps the closest 
analogue to the epistemological ‘justified but wrong’ is ‘exculpated’ (“It would have been better 
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for you to have done A, but under the circumstances we can quite forgive you for having done 
B.”)  I don’t want to make heavy weather of this last point; but I bring up the issue because the 
lack of sensitivity to this distinction in the use of ‘morally justified’ somewhat handicaps me in 
the point I should like to make.  In particular: I should like to describe a rough schema for a kind 
of pragmatic picture of justification without begging any questions in the debate between realists 
and a certain kind of non-realist in ethics.  This difficult task would be made much easier if we 
could talk about the social practice of ethical justification while remaining agnostic on the 
question of whether or not there is anything more to being truly justified—or as I should like to 
say, ultimately right in one’s conduct. Therefore in what follows I shall use the word 
‘justification’ (and its cognates) in a somewhat artificial sense, as a direct analogue to the narrow 
sense of epistemological justification.  Hopefully this will not be seen as in any way question-
begging.  The problem, very roughly, will be that talking about justification in its ‘realist’ 
sense—in the sense of ‘actually right, regardless of what anyone thinks’—is, I think, just what 
misleads us when we investigate this concept.  For—to give a little preview—using the word in 
this sense, in the context of this investigation, induces us to think that there can only be a finite 
list of ‘reasons why some action is wrong’, and this is precisely what I wish to deny.  
Nevertheless, so far from desiring to disparage the realist, I hope to show, when all is said and 
done, that none of my analysis tells in the slightest against moral realism.  However this issue 
must be postponed for the moment, for it can only be seen in the correct light after further work 
has been done.  
With these distinctions in hand I can now tell my story.  In these pages I should like to 
defend the following thesis: there is an ineliminable, pragmatic, contextual element to the 
practice of justification.  This “pragmatic, contextual” element appears in the following way: 
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there is no single ‘reason’—no single belief or desire—or group of reasons that is my reason or 
my set of reasons why I did any action A; and thus what I say in my defense will depend on 
certain facts about my interrogator, in particular, what he knows and doesn’t know, his 
expectations, and so on.93 
It may be helpful, in motivating this thesis, to give a kind of broad sketch of an 
alternative to the traditional understanding, in philosophy, of the concept of justification.  Thus, 
traditionally, justification has been understood as a kind of abstract, timeless relation between 
propositions; one proposition is said to inherit or receive its justification from another, or from 
the position it holds within a ‘web’ of propositions; justification is said to be transmitted from 
one proposition (or belief) to another; etc.94  In epistemological inquiries, this model has tended 
to raise questions about the ‘ultimate source’ of justification, of regresses of justification, and so 
on.   
All of this is perhaps a bit surprising if we look at places where we actually say of 
someone that he is justified or has justified himself.  In any case, the grammar of the word 
‘justify’ is understood, on the tradition, as roughly analogous to the grammar of the word 
‘maintain’: transitive verbs that represent ongoing (non-terminating) processes.95 
My own view is that ‘justification’—as it is ordinarily used—operates much more closely 
analogously to words like ‘heal’, ‘fix’, and ‘vindicate’.  Such words also represent processes—
actions, really—which take time; but they differ from (e.g.) ‘maintain’ in several ways.  In the 
first place, they are ‘terminating’ actions: at some point they can be said to have been completed.  
                                                 
93 Although I would distinguish it from these others, my view shares some elements with the ones forwarded by 
Wellman 1971; Timmons 1999 (see Chapter Five); and the general theory of explanation given in van Fraassen 1980 
(see Chapter Five). 
94 Timmons derides this as the “epistemic charge” view of justification (ibid, p.188). 
95 On the other hand, maintaining is still an action, that is, something done by agents; whereas the tradition speaks 
freely of propositions and beliefs ‘justifying’ things (generally: other propositions).  Perhaps then a better model 
might be the word ‘support’, which indeed is often used interchangeably with ‘justify’ in the literature. 
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Moreover, although they can be put into a predicate position, with their ostensible subjects 
dropped (“The bike is fixed,” “The patient is cured”), they do not seem to operate like such 
simple property predicates as ‘is red’.  In particular, they describe something like a return to a 
default position—though that default position is not namable by the predicate itself.  Thus two 
bikes might be in every other way identical, though of one of them we could say that it ‘is fixed’, 
and not of the other.  As we could say: it is not possible to ‘fix’ some bikes, and for all that there 
might be nothing wrong with them.96   
I am moved by the fact that ‘justify’ operates in many ways like these words—and in 
particular like the word ‘vindicate’, which it appears to closely resemble semantically as well.  In 
at least one of its uses, ‘justify’ refers to an action, which takes time, and can be completed; 
when it appears in the predicate position, it seems to be a passive voice construction out of the 
ordinary, active voice, and not a simple property like ‘is red’; and in the present passive, it 
cannot be joined with a ‘subject’ term by a prepositional phrase, without generating nonsense 
(“The claim is justified by Jones”).  In all these ways it resembles words like ‘fix’ and ‘heal’ and 
‘vindicate’.  And if it really is, like them, a kind of contrastive-status term, then it will not be 
possible to ‘justify’ some claims, though for all that there is nothing wrong with them; on the 
contrary, it will only be possible to justify claims (or perhaps better: justify one’s claiming 
something) if that claim has first been indicted or impugned.97 
Of course the foregoing remarks, inasmuch as they have any merit at all, are something 
like two-edged swords since, it will be said, insofar as it can be made out that the ‘ordinary’ use 
                                                 
96 For this reason it might be better to say that ‘fixed’, ‘cured’—and ‘justified’—name properties of objects only in 
the thinnest sense of the term ‘property’—the same sense that would allow us to say that ‘won’ is a property of some 
games.   
97 The last paragraphs are a summary of a longer discussion I have tried to carry out elsewhere: “Personal 
Justification,” unheralded MS. 
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of ‘justify’ operates as I have claimed, the more it will simply be insisted that, in philosophy, we 
are simply after something else—a timeless, or anyway ongoing, abstract relation between 
propositions, or claims, or believables, or whatever.  However that may be, my hope is that the 
foregoing, and what follows, will be something like mutually reinforcing.   
 
2. Let us take up a simple example of a case where I might be asked to ‘justify myself’ in the 
relevant sense: if I fail, I shall be understood to have done something immoral or wrong.  
Suppose I steal some rolls.  Some moralist takes me to task for this, and now I have to defend 
myself.  Let us further suppose, for the moment, that it is widely accepted that there are 
conditions under which stealing rolls is not wrong.  The most natural thing for me to say, 
supposing that it is true, is: 
 (a) “My family is starving.” 
But suppose on the other hand that my interrogator knows that my family is starving; to him I 
therefore might have to say, 
 (b) “I have no way of earning the money (in time) to buy rolls.” 
I think that in ordinary life, either of these two claims—depending on the context—would 
naturally be called ‘my justification’.  What does this show? It will be natural to object that: 
Of course, when one is pressed for justification, he may say only some one thing or another.  But 
if a man is in fact justified, then there must be a finite number of considerations which, taken 
together, justify him.  You have, in fact, produced two considerations which, for the case in 
question, must both be true for the man to be justified.  But this does not show, what you need, 
that there is not a finite list of considerations which, as I say, together justify you. 
I have to admit that this line of thought is very seductive.  But consider, for example, the 
following additional considerations that might be adduced: 
 (c) “(I thought) these rolls were edible” 
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(d) “(I thought) rolls would provide sufficient nourishment to prevent starvation” 
 (e) “(I thought) no one else would suffer much if I stole the rolls” 
 (f) “(I thought) taking these rolls wouldn’t cause animals to suffer” 
 …. 
Now it is easy to suppose, as I will ask the reader to, that if any of these considerations had been 
false—if I had believed the opposite of any of them—I wouldn’t have taken the rolls.  Does that 
show that any of these could have served as my justification?  
 In the first place, these four considerations can be classed into two groups: the first two 
have, prima facie, no moral content, whereas the latter two are quite clearly morally valenced.98  
But it seems to me that any of these four could play the role of justifying me99; whether or not 
they do will depend on the interests and knowledge of my interrogator.  Thus if Jones fails for 
some reason or another to understand the connection between, say, rolls and starvation, I may 
well have to say to him, e.g., either (c) or (d).  And certainly he will not forgive my theft until he 
understands the connection between it and my goal of preventing starvation.  Of course this 
example is bizarre in the extreme, since just about everyone knows, e.g., that rolls are nourishing 
and edible.  But to make this protest is in fact to grant the central point I wish to make: that what 
we give in justification for our actions depends on what people know and don’t know.  In fact, 
with a little imagination, we can dream up scenarios in which the condition of my family and my 
penury are known by everyone, and thus that (c) and (d) would come up more often in my 
justifications than (a) or (b).100  And it should be quite obvious that (c) and (d) do not exhaust the 
potential reasons of this kind.  In fact, (c) and (d) arguably demonstrate the way in which the 
pragmatic dimension of action explanation carries over to justification, for if Jones had no moral 
                                                 
98 Cf. Foot’s distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ moral relevance in “Are Moral Considerations Overriding?”, 
in her 1978. 
99 Recall that I am using ‘justify’ in a narrow sense. 
100 For example, in a country where everyone is starving, rolls are usually inedible (gone stale), and rolls are often 
used as door-stops. 
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qualms about my taking rolls out of a store without paying, but the same general alimentary 
knowledge, he would most certainly still be asking, “Why did you take the rolls?”, though this 
time with no rebuke, and the right answer could easily be (c) or (d) or both. 
I ought to stress here that the point is entirely general, and does not depend on any quirk 
in the example.  Indeed, items like (c) or (d) could presumably be multiplied indefinitely: in a 
world where rolls often blew up, or contained arsenic; or where getting from one place to another 
was very difficult; or where the police state ensured that I should almost never get away with it; 
in all such worlds I should have to explain to an interlocutor that (as it seemed to me) these 
conditions did not presently hold, and thereby escape his indictment.101 It would be no good to 
protest that such contingencies do not obtain here; that is in effect my point: what counts as a 
justification is relative to the expectations of my interlocutor, what is missing for him; and that in 
turn will be in part be a function of the general pattern of contingencies in his world.  After all, it 
is possible, too, to imagine a world in which food was super-abundant, and no one ever starved; a 
work of philosophy composed in such a world would, I suppose, encounter the same objection 
over its inclusion of (a) as a possible justification.  But that this is no objection is shown by the 
fact that our world is possible—indeed, terrifyingly real. 
What is happening that makes the generation of considerations like (c) and (d) possible? 
Really only this: there are an indefinite number of contingencies we can imagine which would 
make an action fail to come off; or else make it pointless.  If some one of those contingencies 
happens frequently enough, then the justification of a course of action—in the sense of: 
discharging an indictment—will have to make reference to one’s belief that, this time, this 
contingency will not come up.  And really the point is only dramatized by reference to frequency 
                                                 
101 –Supposing, as I think we ought to, that if I (e.g.) knew that I was going to be caught by the police, my action 
would not be justified after all. 
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of some contingency in a context: this helps us make sense of why some interlocutor might be 
puzzled.  But even in our world, a man with very strange ideas might ask after (say) (c) or (d). 
The considerations labeled (e) and (f) are a little different.  The point of including them 
on the list is to remind us that the morality of some action or other could be queried on any 
number of fronts.  Thus if it were meat, and not rolls, that were lifted, (e) or (f) might be the 
appropriate response to someone who, e.g., was cool with stealing but had qualms about certain 
aspects of the poultry industry.  It might be argued that moral progress is sometimes made by 
taking actions never before thought to have moral ‘weight’, and asking, in the light of some 
consideration, whether they’re permissible after all. 
Now there may be a temptation here to say that, in cases where (e) or (f) would be the 
appropriate reply, what is being queried is actually a different action from the one we started 
with—that is, not theft, but (say) complicity in inhumanity.  In fact, I have no problem with this 
suggestion, but it seems to me a matter of indifference since, in the first place, my point 
regarding (c) and (d) would still stand and, in the second, this device, if adopted, would merely 
have the effect of multiplying actions (or action-descriptions) rather than justifications, which, 
from my point of view, comes to much the same thing.  It may be thought, nevertheless, that this 
device has implications for the particularism/generalism debate, though I think this is wrong.  It 
is that debate, in any event, to which we shall now turn. 
 
3. I should like to examine an argument made by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge in defense 
of a particular species of ‘generalism’.  Specifically, I should like to defend the following very 
weak thesis:  
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The very nature of moral thought does not make it necessary that codification of moral principles 
be possible.102   
This is, as I say, a logically weak thesis; and its defense against one argument might hardly be 
supposed to vindicate a particularism of any kind.  But I think reflection on McKeever and 
Ridge’s argument and—as I shall argue—its failure, illuminates the particularist/generalist 
debate quite well, and moreover bears interestingly on the some broader themes.  The argument 
in question can be paraphrased roughly thus:  
While there may be someone who is entirely morally virtuous, but unable to articulate the reasons 
for his choices, the truly practically wise agent is someone who always successfully identifies all 
candidate reasons (for doing or refraining from doing something); successfully identifies the 
relevant ‘defeaters’ and ‘enablers’—i.e., those considerations which either make a putative reason 
irrelevant, or a putatively irrelevant consideration relevant; and successfully identifies what there 
is most reason to do when the candidate reasons are, as a group, equivocal.  Now if there could be 
such a man—and surely we all agree to this—then it must be possible to codify all of morality 
into principles in the form of conditionals, where the antecedents contain only descriptive terms, 
and the consequents contain moral verdicts on action.  For, whatever the phronimos identifies in 
the way of reasons (and defeaters and enablers), he must identify all of them, as we’ve said, and, 
after all, no one, not even our imaginary phronimos, could identify an infinite number of things, 
since he is merely a human being.  So in fact the number of reasons (etc..) must be finite and, 
moreover, manageably small in number.  Therefore these ‘reasons’ could be put into the 
antecedents of conditionals, and we would end up with a system of manageable moral 
principles.103   
Now the argument as it stands is not complete, since, for example, it is not clear from the 
foregoing why we should believe that the antecedents of these conditionals could really be 
reduced to ‘purely descriptive’ terms.  And if the antecedents of these principles were to contain 
‘thick moral terms’, the generalist will have shown very little: if we assume the unity of the 
                                                 
102 This is, effectively, what McKeever & Ridge label “Anti-Transcendental Particularism,” in their 2006; see pp. 
15-16. 
103 Adapted from McKeever & Ridge, pp. 140-144. 
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virtues, as has traditionally been done by virtue ethicists, then, e.g., “If an act would be kind, do 
it,” is fairly uncontroversial; obviously the difficulty lies in deciding which cases are cases of 
kindness, and the particularist will merely assert that the difficulty, just swept under the rug, re-
emerges here.  This point, which scarcely needs saying in the present context, is perhaps rather 
important in another; but we shall revisit it in the end.104 Suffice it to say, McKeever and Ridge 
advance a different argument, a little later, to patch up this hole—or rather, a reiterated variation 
on the same argument.  We shall return to this issue as well. 
 
4. One is impressed with the feeling, rehearsing this argument, that he has witnessed some 
sleight of hand; and I think this impression is justified.  But what has gone wrong here? 
 Well, what are we being asked to imagine when we are asked to imagine someone who 
always “successfully identif[ies] candidate reasons” and “successfully identif[ies] what there is 
most reason to do”?105  This is as much to say, “God always knows what the right thing to do 
is—and the right reasons for so doing.  What those reasons are we can’t say, but that is another 
matter.”  But even God would have to convince us.   
 I can’t speak for the reader, but when I try to imagine the phronimos as here described, I 
imagine a man standing in front of a painting, a depiction of a ‘moral situation’, and the man 
draws circles around various parts of the picture—the relevant candidate reasons.  But of course 
this won’t quite do, since, e.g., ‘the fact that she wasn’t coerced’ might be a relevant reason, and 
quite clearly this can’t be circled in a painting.   
                                                 
104 It is tempting to say that this point—that morality can surely be captured in principles spelled out in thick 
terms—would be denied by no one; but actually Dancy, the arch-particularist, does deny it (see his 2004, p. 84-5; 
118-123).  For a defense of a kind of soft particularism, which allows that morality can be codified in rules that 
make use of thick moral terms, see McNaughton and Rawlings 2000.  I am largely in agreement with the 
conclusions of their paper, though I am less sure about the arguments. 
105 Ibid, p. 140. 
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Now the fact that lacks can be reasons is not strictly necessary for our point, but it 
illustrates the point rather dramatically.  That point is, in fact, just the one made above (§2), 
namely, what counts as a reason for or against some action is, in part, a function of the interests, 
knowledge, and demands of one’s interlocutor; and the limits on these latter are amorphous, 
shifting, and, most important, not delimitable a priori.  If this is right, then clearly morality is not 
necessarily codifiable.106 But it is worth working through some of the details to see why this is 
so. 
We can usefully begin with the example from §2 above.  How might we formulate a 
principle indicating when it is permissible to steal? Supposing, as we did above, that there is at 
least one kind of exception to the general prohibition, and passing over the problem of how the 
ostensibly ‘thick’ term ‘steal’ might be cashed out in descriptive terms, we might begin with: 
(P1) It is wrong to steal, unless one is starving and needs food.  (I.e., if an action would be an act 
of theft, don’t do it, unless one is starving and needs food.) 
This is a pretty good principle, and I think I’d more or less endorse it for use in daily life.  
However, it will not suit the generalist’s needs as it stands.  In the first place we had better 
amend it to: 
(P2) It is wrong to steal, unless one is starving and needs food, in which case one may steal food. 
This qualification having been made, we may recognize that P2 is still ambiguous, and thus feel 
compelled to rewrite it as: 
(P3) It is wrong to steal, unless one is starving and needs food, in which case one may steal food, 
provided that that food is edible and capable of nourishing. 
                                                 
106 Which is not at all to say that morality is necessarily uncodifiable.  It is hard to put this point in a non-tendentious 
way, but I should like to say: if men in the future should decide that utilitarianism was the correct moral view (and 
not: the correct moral theory), then they should have to say that morality was codifiable.  Perhaps it would be best to 
say: the truth of (principled) particularism or generalism could only follow from our moral views, and not precede 
them.     
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It needs no mentioning that this principle is rather ridiculous; and yet P2 really was in one way 
incomplete: if I was right in what I argued above, then considerations (c) and (d) can sometimes 
be reasons which justify my action.  And if they are then they will need to be referenced in any 
‘complete’ principle.  For clearly the fact that I am starving does not license me to steal food 
which I know I cannot eat.  In which case references to conditions (e) and (f) will have to be 
made as well.  Thus we shall have: 
P4) It is wrong to steal, unless one is starving and needs food, in which case one may steal food, 
provided that that food is edible and capable of nourishing, and provided that the theft does not 
result in significant suffering for anyone else, nor in the suffering of animals. 
And so on.  Conditions (e) and (f) will have to be built into any principle concerning theft to 
protect it from what we might call ‘novel moral objections’.  It might be argued here that we do 
not need to add riders for (e) and (f), but only add something to the effect of, “and so long as, in 
doing so, one does not violate any other moral rule.” Perhaps that can be made to work; but it 
expresses an optimism about the number of other rules that might seem, in light of the present 
discussion, misplaced.107  I will not pursue that question here.  In any case it is irrelevant since, if 
the discussion in §2 was sound, conditions like (c) and (d)—rather esoteric, apparently ‘non-
moral’ conditions—can be multiplied indefinitely. 
 
5. McKeever and Ridge disparage the possibility that esoteric facts—such as: the color of one’s 
shoelaces—could be morally significant.  In fact they have an argument to the effect that such 
considerations cannot be relevant, and I will consider it shortly, although I must admit that I am 
not sure I understand it.  The question to which we need an answer is: what makes a 
                                                 
107 It must be remembered that these other rules are all, also, to be spelled out without the help of any ‘thick’ moral 
terms. 
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consideration ethically significant? I have just argued, effectively, that nearly any consideration 
can be ethically significant in the right context.  On the other hand, it must be admitted that some 
considerations seem to have a prima facie ethical significance which other considerations lack.  
McKeever and Ridge consider the possibility of a distinction between “primary” and 
“secondary” reasons,108 before ultimately rejecting it.  But others have found some usefulness in 
similar distinctions, e.g., between “default” and “non-default” reasons,109 or “direct” and 
“indirect” moral significance.110 One tempting possibility which is suggested by the general 
tactics of this essay is to align the distinction between secondary and primary reasons (as I shall 
call them) with the distinction between those considerations which could be morally relevant in 
certain contexts, but generally are not, and those considerations which are almost always morally 
relevant.   
This characterization is perhaps rather thin; but as I shall put no weight on it in what 
follows, it hardly matters.  The point I do wish to stress in the present context is that, if a 
distinction of this sort is tenable, it would nevertheless be a mistake to think that primary reasons 
would remain primary reasons in all worlds.  For what counts as a primary reason may be 
relative to a culture—a fact which, I hasten to add, gives no aid or comfort to any ‘ethical 
relativism’.  Consider the following case: 
Suppose I am being pressured by the high school cross-country coach to join the team; 
but I hate racing, particularly because I hate the anxiety induced by these kinds of competitive 
events.  Incidentally, one of my moral failings is an over-strong desire to have other people like 
me.  Finally one day I do join the team, run the race.  And my friend J says, “How could you do 
                                                 
108 The distinction comes from J.L Urmson’s “A Defence of Intuitionism” (1974) cited in McKeever and Ridge 2006 
at 130.  
109 Dancy, e.g., in his 2004. 
110 Philippa Foot, ibid.: see fn. 98. 
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that? How could you be buffaloed into running for the team? That’s so cowardly of you.”  And I 
offer in justification: “You know what? It suddenly struck me, I really did want to race.  I just 
felt a powerful desire to compete and win.”  A scene like this is admittedly not terribly common.  
(Although they do happen.)  In fact, the rarity of such scenes is important.  But the present point 
is that it is easily imaginable, it could happen.  Now imagine a tribe—“high school students”—
for whom not being buffaloed into stuff is very important and in fact comes up all the time.  If 
this tribe should develop its own moral vocabulary, the following might be one of their 
principles: don’t do anything that you don’t want to do.  It’s worth noting that this principle is 
defeasible.  But we mustn’t imagine that there are more exceptions to this rule than instances of 
it; again, we must imagine that “getting buffaloed” is something that comes up all the time in this 
culture, and therefore something to guard against.   
Now in the first place we should note that we—we non-high school students—can accept 
and agree with the “moral outlook” of this tribe: after all, it is cowardly to be steamrolled into 
things one doesn’t want to do.  But their principle will be no principle of ours, since, in our own 
lives, it is probably (much) more often important to do what one does not want to do, than to 
refrain from doing what one doesn’t want to do.  What does this show? 
I think this shows that principles are relative to one’s circumstances—or rather, are 
relative to the larger patterns and likely contingencies of one’s life.  So the idea of “the principles 
that the truly practically wise agent follows” or “the principles that we can read off from the 
behavior of the practically wise agent” makes no sense.111  This is the problem with merely 
supposing an imaginary practically wise agent who “always successfully identif[ies] candidate 
reasons”: ‘reasons’ are not helpfully thought of as features of a situation, but rather as things we 
                                                 
111 I do not mean to imply that no one ever thinks in terms of moral principles, or even that it is a bad thing to do so. 
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say to each other to justify ourselves.  And what we say to someone to justify ourselves will 
depend on all sorts of facts about that other person—in particular: what is salient to her, what 
sort of contingencies she’s on the lookout for, what she takes for granted and what she doesn’t, 
what the major variables are for her in ethical situations.  And this is what I meant by “Even God 
would have to convince us.”  
 
6. Now McKeever and Ridge consider, what they acknowledge would be fatal to their program, 
the possibility just defended, that “any consideration can be a reason.”  And they reject this 
possibility on the basis of a distinction between ‘a reason an action is wrong (right)’ and ‘a 
reason to believe an action is wrong (right)’.  Like most distinctions, this one could clearly be put 
to some use or other.  But in the context of McKeever and Ridge’s discussion, it looks like 
straight-forward question-begging.  Thus, they write: 
Jonathan Dancy suggests that in the right contexts the fact that someone asks you for the time is a 
reason to tell her.  In our view, the fact that the person asked you for the time is a reason to 
believe you ought to tell her and not itself a reason to tell her.  The reason to tell the person 
presumably is something like the fact that telling her would be polite, or the fact that it would 
satisfy some desire of hers, would undermine her anxiety, or would help her achieve some 
(morally permissible) end.  If telling the person the time would do none of these things then there 
may be no reason to tell her even though there may still be reason to believe that you ought to tell 
her.  Of course, we could count the fact that she asked as a further reason to tell her in addition to 
all of these other reasons, but this seems like one reason too many….112 
In the first place, this example is actually quite useful, since it minimizes the temptation 
to imagine a deliberative process preceding one’s action—no one thinks at all before giving the 
time—and therefore minimizes the temptation to suppose that one’s ‘reason for action’ was 
whatever one considered just before acting.  But I must confess that I don’t entirely understand 
                                                 
112 McKeever and Ridge 2006, p. 126. 
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the rationale for the move being employed here.  On my view, of course, all of the listed 
potential reasons could be a reason to tell Robinson (as we might call her) the time—what one 
would actually give as his reason would depend on the context.  But I cannot understand how one 
could deny that Robinson’s asking me the time is a reason to tell her.  Certainly, it would make a 
fine answer to the question, “Why did you just tell that woman what time it was?” I think it is 
possible that what is moving McKeever and Ridge here is the fact—which I gladly concede—
that the situations in which one would explain his having told someone the time by saying, “She 
asked me the time,” are few and far between.  But, as I have said, this is just the point I should 
like to make.       
Now there is something misleading about the list of potential reasons given in the quoted 
argument, since that list contains “the fact that it would satisfy some desire” of Robinson’s; and 
then McKeever and Ridge go on to say that “if telling the person the time would do none of these 
things then there may be no reason to tell her.”  Surely if Robinson has no desire to know the 
time, but asked me anyway (why?), then there may be no ‘objective’ reason to tell her: it would 
be pointless.  But presumably this is a red herring.   
In fact, McKeever and Ridge reject the possibility that one’s “conscious thoughts”113 are 
dispositive of one’s reasons for acting, as indeed they must, since one may think of all sorts of 
things just before one acts.  They note that if (enlivening her character) Robinson has promised 
to buy her friend a plaid cap, she may only think—i.e., have the “conscious thought”—before 
buying one, “This one’s plaid, so I’ll buy it.”  But then they write: 
Her conscious thoughts might instead be understood as enthymatic [sic].  When fully spelled out 
this argument might instead go something like, “This baseball cap is plaid, I promised to buy my 
friend a plaid baseball cap, I have good reason to fulfill this promise, so I ought to buy it; 
                                                 
113 Ibid, p. 130. 
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therefore I will buy it.” One reason for understanding [Robinson’s] thoughts in this way would be 
that she would articulate the premisses of the argument if pressed for an explicit justification. 
But of course, this isn’t actually true.  What Robinson would say would depend on what 
she was asked.  And in some situations there would be many other things she would have to add 
to her “explicit justification”—for example, “And I have enough money now to feed my starving 
children,” and perhaps, “I share the execrable sartorial sensibility of my friend.”   
I think McKeever and Ridge actually give the game away in the next paragraph, where 
they write:  
Eccentric facts like the fact that one would be buying a plaid baseball cap for someone are hardly 
guaranteed to make the action seem morally attractive to a virtuous agent.  Imagine trying to 
explain to a morally wise but puzzled agent who does not know about your promise why you are 
buying a plaid baseball cap simply by saying, “Look, this is the buying of a plaid baseball cap! 
Oh, and no other feature of the situation explains why that fact is not a good moral reason to buy 
it.”114  
Here McKeever and Ridge are making use of exactly the device which is the lynchpin of my 
view, namely that what one gives as a reason depends on what one’s interlocutor knows.  Of 
course, McKeever and Ridge are right that Robinson’s justification (or explanation) of her action 
here is terrible; but this is precisely because her wise but bemused interlocutor is only told what 
she does know, rather than what she doesn’t.115     
In fact this example is not quite right for the generalist’s argument, since, as it is given, it 
is not clear what Robinson is supposed to be justifying herself about—except perhaps her bad 
taste.  Moreover, the discussion was supposed to be about the plausibility of “This is a plaid 
baseball cap” being a reason for action, not “This is the buying of a plaid baseball cap.” 
Emending the example then, we would have: 
                                                 
114 Ibid, emphasis added. 
115 Their use of the word ‘guaranteed’ is also illicit, though perhaps telling. 
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Imagine trying to justify yourself before a morally wise but puzzled agent—who 1) knows about 
your promise but 2) thinks ‘plaid’ means tattersall and vice versa, and 3) is now taking you to 
task for your purchase—simply by saying, “Look, this is a plaid baseball cap! Oh, and no other 
feature of the situation explains why that fact is not a good moral reason to buy it.” 
Guarantees are of course neither here nor there; but this looks like a pretty good justification. 
I think this gives us good ground to reject—in this context—the distinction between ‘a 
reason an action is wrong (right)’ and ‘a reason for believing an action is wrong (right).’ One is 
tempted to suppose that McKeever and Ridge employ this distinction merely because it suits 
their purposes; at at least one point, their language seems to betray this.116  But again I 
acknowledge that I may be missing something here. 
 
7.  It should now be clear why I have employed this (somewhat) artificial sense of ‘justification’ 
in the foregoing discussion: to speak, as the alternative would demand, of ‘right-making 
features’, would only encourage the intuition that, whatever one may say in his defense, his 
action will only be right if it is made right by some ‘feature(s)’ of the situation; which, in turn, 
encourages the intuition that the principles of morality must be codifiable.  Thus, McKeever and 
Ridge, considering wrong-making features, write, “[N]obody seriously contends that our senses 
tell us everything.  So the features of a situation in virtue of which we just see that a given action 
is wrong must themselves be limited.”117 Strictly speaking, the quoted argument is invalid, 
relying as it does on the illicit inference from “It is impossible that we see everything” to “What 
we see is finite.” I suspect that the apparent plausibility of their conclusion trades on a 
particular—a problematic—conception of “features of a situation.” In fact, I have no objection to 
talk about ‘right-making features’, ‘wrong-making features’, or ‘features of a situation’ quite 
                                                 
116 Ibid, p. 129: “Even if the thought, ‘this cap is plaid’ did figure in the deliberation…we need not understand it as 
her reason for action.  We could instead understand that thought as her reason for belief.” 
117 Ibid, p. 115. 
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generally, so long as it is borne in mind that the ‘features’ of a ‘situation’ are infinite in number, 
being, as they are, merely reflections of what one might possibly say in successfully defending 
himself.   
As the last sentence indicates, my picture involves a kind of reversal, of one aspect 
anyway, of the picture employed by many moral philosophers.  For whereas McKeever and 
Ridge evidently imagine a world of ‘features’, some of which are morally relevant, and a 
phronimos who reads these latter features off the world and then acts on them,118 I should prefer 
to say that what counts as a morally relevant feature of a situation is read back into the world 
after it appears as the content of a justification. 
 
8. Where does this leave our thought experiment? The challenge posed by McKeever and Ridge 
was: the bare possibility of a truly practically wise agent entails the codifiability of ethics.  But I 
have argued that morality is not necessarily codifiable.119  Must I now deny that the truly 
practically wise agent is possible? Before answering this question we must look once more at the 
thought experiment, in the new light of the foregoing discussion. 
McKeever and Ridge imagine the phronimos as “successfully identifying the candidate 
reasons” and “successfully identifying what there is most reason to do.” Now ‘successfully 
identify’, like ‘know’ is factive; and therefore we are tempted to think that, whatever a man may 
say in justification of himself, his action is made right by some ‘feature’ or other of the situation; 
and since a man, as the limited creature he is, can only ‘identify’ so many things, it looks as 
though, if a man—the phronimos—can always ‘successfully identify’ the features that make an 
                                                 
118  “[R]easons themselves are simply descriptive facts which favor not performing the action,” p. 115. 
119 —While conceding that, for example, if we all agreed that utilitarianism was correct, generalism would follow 
trivially.   
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action right (or wrong), these features can be listed as the antecedents of conditionals which just 
are the true moral principles.  But if my argument up till now has been sound, then to imagine 
the phronimos is to imagine a man who, should he say of some action, “This was the right thing 
to do,” will, no matter what we should reproach him with, always come out on the right side.  
That is, he will be able to convince us, for whatever consideration we should raise, that that 
consideration does not count decisively against the action.  And I should like to say: this is quite 
imaginable. 
It will help here to put the argument in its most direct form.  Thus the generalist will want 
to say:  
We can willing grant—though one must be rather cynical to say so—that some sophisticate may 
be capable of always being ‘justified’—in your sense of that term—in ethical matters.  But we 
were not talking about this kind of justification.  We were supposing that the phronimos is always 
truly justified—justified regardless of whether or not anyone thinks that he is.  After all, an action 
is either right or wrong; and these facts transcend what anyone has to say about the matter.  So all 
your talk about the relativity of ‘justification’ is simply irrelevant here.  For if you admit that facts 
about right and wrong transcend what anyone thinks—as you must, on pain of endorsing one of 
the most callow and jejune of anti-realisms—you must further admit that what makes some action 
right or wrong runs free of what anyone says to justify himself—in fact is logically independent 
of the latter.   
Here again we see the difficulties that come from employing the ‘wide’ sense of ‘justified’.  
What we should all admit, I take it, is that whether someone has acted well or acted badly—done 
the right thing or the wrong thing—is independent of what he says to us.  Someone can have 
done the right thing and convince no one that he is not a sinner; or done the wrong thing and 
convince everyone that he is a saint.  If we choose to use ‘justified’ in the wide sense, it will 
follow that someone can be ‘justified’, too, though he has convinced no one—just supposing he 
has rehearsed—or: is aware of?—the ‘right reason’.  But, in light of the foregoing discussion, the 
idea that there is some one, or some few, ‘right reasons’, which suffice to justify a man when he 
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has (e.g.) been indicted for theft; this idea looks more and more like an unsupported hunch.  Just 
what would single it out?         
I myself cannot see the point of a concept of moral justification which cuts it off so 
radically from what people actually say to each other.  I think we should insist that, when we are 
asked to imagine a man who is always right in moral matters, while prescinding from any 
reference to the practical activity of justification, we no longer have any idea what we are 
imagining.  Our judgment of him as being right in moral matters must go through the social 
practice of justification.  And therefore—what in some ways is more obvious—our moral 
principles must reflect this social practice of justification.  And so, if my argument till now has 
been sound, and this practice is inflected by contextual and pragmatic considerations, our 
principles must reflect these considerations in turn.   
For these reasons, it seems to me more clear to ask, not whether the phronimos is 
possible, but what we should say of someone who appeared to be the phronimos.  The first 
possibility, at which I have already hinted, is that we may suppose, with the cynic, that the 
putative phronimos, while considerably good at justifying himself, may yet be wrong in at least 
some of his judgments—even though we can’t say why.  This is to say that this ‘phronimos’ may 
be no phronimos after all, but a sophisticated fraud; and therefore no explanation of his ‘ability’ 
may be necessary.  
Now to endorse this view of the ‘phronimos’ is not yet to plump for callow anti-realism.  
In fact the callow anti-realist, having conflated ‘justification’ in my narrow sense and 
‘justification’ in its ordinary sense, cannot even take such a view; all she can say is that the 
‘phronimos’ is considerably good at justifying himself, and therefore right in what he does.  
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What the callow anti-realist shares with the cynic is an explanation for the apparent talent of the 
phronimos: it is a talent for argument. 
But there is no reason to be so cynical.  One possible explanation for the phronimos’s 
talent might be sketched along the lines adumbrated by Professor McDowell.  Thus if McDowell 
is right, and the rules governing the use of thick moral terms like ‘cruel’ and ‘charitable’ can not 
be cashed out in purely descriptive terms—because there is no pattern at the subvenient level—
then it would be possible to reconcile the phronimos’s talent—he just sees cases of kindness and 
cruelty—with my argument against the necessary codifiability of morality.120 But the phronimos, 
then, will display his talent for justification, not in giving some one knockdown reason; but by 
being able to answer any possible query put to him.   
Against this kind of “thick intuitionism”121 McKeever and Ridge redeploy a version of 
their original argument for the codifiability of ethics: any thick moral term must supervene on 
descriptive facts; if someone has competence with a thick moral term, then he uses it exactly 
where the right descriptive features are present; and for someone to be so competent, there must 
be only a manageably small number of descriptive terms which fix the use of each thick term.122 
It is hard to square this thought with any intuitive picture of the thick moral terms we 
actually use.  But in any case, if the argument against moral principles above was sound, it will 
work equally well here.  In fact, arguments over whether or not some act was permissible (“I 
                                                 
120 See McDowell 1979 and 1981. 
121 The term derives from McNaughton and Rawlings 2000, quoted in McKeever and Ridge at p. 147. 
122 See McKeever and Ridge, p. 147-8. 
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stole the food, but was that wrong?”) can often be recast as arguments over the correct 
application of thick moral terms (“I took the food, but was that theft?”).123 
This move may well spur the generalist to ask, in parallel fashion, how it could then be 
possible for someone always to recognize cases of cruelty.  I shall not try here to recapitulate the 
relevant McDowellian arguments here—but only add that the force of this question derives its 
plausibility, I think, from the idea that there is a kind of metaphysical ‘sameness’ from which all 
other ‘samenesses’ must derive: it is not prima facie obvious why it should be more difficult to 
apply and reapply (say) ‘courageous’ than (say) ‘danger’.     
 
9. A codicil.  While we are on the topic, we should consider one further generalist objection to 
the possibility of uncodifiable ethics.  Thus it might be said:  
You’ve made reasons relative to context and world.  But couldn’t one say that principles followed 
by the phronimos would merely vary from context to context, and world to world? That is, why 
not suppose that that each context and world just has its own principles; and that the truly wise 
practical agent, sensitive to contexts and world, merely changes his principles from context to 
context accordingly? 
Something like this could perhaps be said; and it even seems to capture something of our 
ordinary experience of moral reasoning.  The problem, as I see it, is that a move like this merely 
shifts the problem, from infinitely long principles to an infinite number of rules.  It seems to me a 
matter of decision whether we say, for example, that we have one rule regarding theft or many—
although it is a decision that would, again, have some consequences: as I say, it may be a matter 
of psychological fact that we often think in terms of rough-and-ready rules, and, for example, 
                                                 
123 This is not to say that this choice will not have consequences: if we think it makes sense, e.g., to admit that some 
action falls under the domain of a particular virtue (say, benevolence), but then ask whether or not it was really the 
right thing to do, we may have to deny the unity of the virtues. 
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teaching our children one hundred rules or ten may make some psychological, and therefore 
some moral, difference.  
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4 THE METHOD OF MORAL HYPOTHESIS 
 
1. What I want in this chapter to argue is, in effect, that working towards a general moral theory 
makes about as much sense as working towards a general theory of jokes.  Now some people 
might think a Unified Joke Theory might be a good idea; even I have to concede that it would 
interest me in a manner of speaking. But there are a lot of reasons to think a General Theory of 
Jokes would not be a very good idea; that, in any case, there are a lot of things such a theory 
could not do; and, I shall argue, many of these considerations carry over to the idea of a general 
theory of morality.124     
Suppose we came up with a Unified Joke Theory; what might it look like? We can 
imagine such a theory consisting in a system of hedged principles: “a joke is funny if it..., so 
long as it doesn’t..., or ... [and so on].” I can dimly imagine at least some of these principles.125 
How might such principles be devised? Presumably, we look at things we think are funny, and 
we apply something like Mill’s Method of Differences: why is this joke funny when that one 
isn’t? Such a procedure might yield such general principles, as I say; but then of course the 
principle will always be in danger of being undone by some counter-example (a case, e.g., where 
                                                 
124 Some of what I say below might seem rather glib; but I hope that by the end, I will, not so much have dispelled 
the feeling of silliness, but transferred it to my target: moral theorizing.   
125 I have heard it said that a joke is funnier, all things being equal, the more specific it is.  That actually strikes me 
as a fair general principle. 
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a non-specific joke is funnier than a specific one).  Not that any such example would ruin the 
principle: we might merely have to hedge it further.  It will be in our interest then, in devising 
such a theory, to find as many examples as possible, before pronouncing any principle correct.  
—And even then, we shall have to allow that the principle might not be correct after all. 
On the other hand, there is another method for dealing with counter-examples: if we 
cannot see how some one apparent counter-example is really to be distinguished—cannot, that 
is, discover the appropriate hedge for our comedic principle—then it would be possible, anyway 
in theory, to suppose that the error lies not with the principle, but with the joke: however much it 
may make us laugh, the joke is not—it transpires—really funny.   
I submit that this would be a ridiculous procedure.  Evidently, part of what makes 
something funny is: that we find it funny.  On the other hand, this last thought is consistent with 
the following thought: we can be wrong about what’s funny.  That is one big step towards the 
notion of objectivity in humor.  And I think that we should accept that this is not merely a 
notional possibility, that we do, in fact, believe in some objectivity in humor; for we do, at times, 
retract our claim that some joke was funny.  Sometimes, we do this when the joke no longer 
elicits a laugh.  But here it is worth noting that we don’t always react to such situations merely 
by saying, “That joke isn’t funny anymore.” Sometimes we say: “I thought it was funny, but it 
wasn’t, really.” And there are other cases, too.  Sometimes we still laugh, but deny that it’s 
actually funny.  Here we say, “I can’t help laughing, even though I know it isn’t funny.”126 127   
                                                 
126 It might be objected here that this most often happens when we find something funny which, at the same time, we 
regard as in some way morally offensive; and that therefore this element of the analogy cannot carry over.  But this 
isn’t, in fact, the only kind of case: “I never find physical comedy funny, I think it’s stupid; I must be laughing 
because I’m in a giddy mood.” 
127 Other considerations also point towards a belief in ‘objective humor’: when we call someone ‘humorless’, we do 
not mean that he doesn’t laugh at many things; we mean that we is missing something—i.e., wrong. 
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Nevertheless, there are other uses—uses besides overturning our existing comedic 
judgments—to which we might put our Unified Theory of Jokes.  So, for example, we might 
wheel in the Unified Theory in order to convince someone else.  Thus, if Jones doesn’t find my 
joke funny, I might deploy the Unified Theory, and explain to him why it is.  Now it is a 
notorious fact that a joke cannot be made funny by being explained; that explaining a joke will 
usually, in fact, spoil the joke for everyone.  Does that mean I must be wrong about the reasons 
why the joke is funny? Of course not; but it does at least seem to show that the Unified Theory 
will be useless for this purpose, too. 
Here it may be well to remind ourselves that, at least occasionally, we are unsure about 
whether a joke is funny; our judgment on the matter is somehow suspended.  Could the Unified 
Theory help us out here, by telling us what to think about novel cases? Suppose the theory tells 
us that some novel joke is very funny; could this decide the matter? I suppose this could have the 
effect of having us say that the joke was funny; but it is hard to see what further consequences it 
could have.  If we don’t find ourselves spontaneously laughing—I leave aside the interesting and 
by no means irrelevant phenomenon of fake laughter—then, evidently, whatever we might say, 
the Unified Theory has failed to alter our judgments. Here, too, then, the Theory is less than 
obviously useful. 
We might contrast this use of the theory with another, similar method, that does not 
invoke principles of humor at all.  For we can and do sometimes get a friend to get a joke, and 
this does not always consist in (e.g.) filling in ‘background information’.  Obviously, there are 
many things we can do here: we can relate the joke to another one; try to emphasize certain 
aspects of it which may have gone under-appreciated; and even, sometimes, give the reasons 
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why it’s funny.  Any of these tricks might succeed or fail; but of course, failure will not convince 
us that the joke isn’t funny after all.  “It’s too bad for him he doesn’t see it,” we might say. 
This last point may remind us that, insofar as we do believe in something like ‘an 
objective funny’, the Unified Theory project might nevertheless have a purpose after all.   
Yes [it might be said], the Theory will be powerless to overturn our ‘comedic intuitions’; it will in 
all probability convince no one; and it cannot tell us anything about novel cases; nevertheless [—
and here one must switch to the first-person singular—] I know when a joke is funny. [Or 
perhaps: “I and my like-minded friends in my social set.”] And it would in any case be an 
interesting project to discover just what makes a joke funny.  After all, it is a bit of a mystery; and 
why couldn’t there be a set of enumerable principles which give necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a joke’s being funny? In fact, there must be such a set, given that we are all, after 
all, ‘finite creatures’, and thus we must be operating with some set of principles. 
The last line contains a mistake, I think.128  But at the moment I want to raise a question 
about this semi-aesthetic project.  Suppose we grant the possibility that someone’s sense of 
humor could be codified in principles; suppose we even grant that the general sensibility—and 
hence the principles as well (?)—are widely shared.  Still, one might ask, what would the point 
be, when we know full well that, in twenty or thirty, or anyway one hundred years’ time, this 
sensibility will have been wiped from the face of the earth?  
What I emphatically do not mean, here, is that humor is, after all, and in the face of 
history, a subjective affair.  For it would be possible, e.g., to think that (say) older American 
cinema evinces an unsophisticated sense of humor; or, supposing one is old enough, to regard 
the contemporary Anglo-American comedic sense as a degeneration.  (I have heard both claims 
made.) So there is no barrier to thinking that, if, in a hundred years, everyone is going to have a 
                                                 
128 See Chapter 3. 
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much different sense of humor, then nevertheless, they will be quite wrong—will have 
degenerated, or forgotten what is really funny, or something of the kind. 
My point is, rather, that, however we choose to regard our descendants (or our forebears), 
our Unified Theory will be useless to them, as they will reject it, root and branch.  And I think 
that that must take some of the interest out of such a project.  Needless to say, the problem is 
compounded by the (obvious) fact that other cultures presently living will not find anything of 
merit in our Unified Theory; and that, as it happens, there are probably wildly diverging senses 
of humor even within (e.g.) American culture.   
There is of course one way to avoid this difficulty, where the aim is to make the Unified 
Theory so close to contentless that it will accommodate just about any sense of humor.  I think 
there is something to such a suggestion, and I will return to it in the end.  For now I only note 
that such a ‘theory’ would not look very much like, nor satisfy many of the ambitions of, the 
kind of thing we began with.   
 
2. My aim here, of course, is to try to transfer our skepticism about the Unified Theory of Jokes 
to the ‘moral theory project’.  In particular, I shall be arguing that a moral theory, like our 
imagined theory of jokes, is a doubtful ground for overturning our spontaneous verdicts; is, at 
best, just one among many methods of persuading others about moral conclusions, and not a 
terribly effective method at that; would be a more or less arbitrary way of determining the 
‘answers’ to novel moral cases; and, as a mere systematizing project, is likely to be of merely 
parochial interest.  It is to the first of these points that I shall devote the most attention; firstly 
because I think it is the most important; but second because I believe many of my suggestions 
here will transfer in an obvious way to the other points.   
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But before making this case, it will be worthwhile to pause and ask just what a ‘moral 
theory’ is, or anyway, what I shall mean by it in the following.  For many things have gone under 
this name, and evidently the term is no longer transparent.  Thus, e.g., I do not mean by ‘moral 
theory’, “any and all meta-ethical theorizing.” For one thing, I take it that I am currently engaged 
in some kind of meta-ethical thinking myself in these pages; and, more seriously, nothing I say 
here is meant to cast doubt on the project of getting clear on our ethical concepts.  That seems to 
me a real task and perhaps a pressing one.   
No, what I mean by ‘moral theory’—or, better, ‘moral theorizing’—is this: the task of 
trying to bring our various spontaneous moral judgments into some systematic, unified whole, 
typically, by bringing individual judgments under principles, and then those principles under 
more general principles still; and in particular the version of this project in which it is accepted 
that some of our spontaneous moral judgments will have to go, under pressure from the 
systematizing requirement.129  We find this project going on, from one end, in theorists who 
begin by deploying some very general formula, a kind of master principle of morality, and try to 
work their way down to particular judgments130; these theorists are generally acknowledged to 
be engaged in ‘moral theory’. But the term—‘moral theorizing’—could be applied with equal 
justice to those theorists who work from the other end: who begin with some set of spontaneous 
moral verdicts (‘moral intuitions’) about ostensibly similar cases, and try to develop some 
                                                 
129 I take this is also what Professor Setiya has in mind in his “Does Moral Theory Corrupt the Youth?” (nd); he 
defines his target there as “the kind of theory that takes our moral intuitions seriously as starting points and aims to 
produce a systematic body of principles that vindicates these intuitions by endorsing them, undermines them by 
failing to do so, and yields justified claims where they [those intuitions] are silent” (pp. 3-4).  Cf. also Thomas 
Hurka, quoted in Setiya (p.4), writing of the project of the early 20th Century British moralists: “These theorists 
shared the general normative project of systematizing common-sense morality, or finding more abstract principles 
that can unify and explain our particular judgements about right and wrong. […] only if its judgements could be 
systematized by a few fundamental principles would they be properly scientific” (Hurka 2004). 
130 Recent examples include Scanlon 1998; or Parfit in his On What Matters. (See esp. p. 305 of the latter in the MS 
for a statement of what moral theory is up to, and its connection with ‘reflective equilibrium’.  Both philosophers 
call their theories ‘contractualism’, and this is indeed one form the big project sometimes takes.) 
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principle which will divide the cases according to our intuitions.  What is again vital, for my 
point, is the willingness of these theorists to abandon some recalcitrant ‘intuition’ if it fails to fit 
the general pattern.  Of course (as we shall see in a moment), the offending intuition is not 
merely abandoned; some attempt is always made to ‘account’ for it.  But, as I shall argue, there 
remains something problematic here nonetheless.  My aim, in what follows, will be to suggest 
some grounds for Annette Baier’s suspicion of “the whole idea of a moral ‘theory’ which 
systematizes and extends a body of moral judgments, and […] in particular the idea that a 
theorist might accept a theory with controversial implications, without thereby becoming a moral 
reformer, one dedicated to having these implications endorsed and acted upon.”131   
 
3. In a recent paper132, Judith Jarvis Thomson revisits the infamous Trolley Problem, and 
concludes that, in fact, and in spite of her own previous arguments to the contrary, what 
“explains the difference between our verdicts” in the various modulations on the Problem is 
Philippa Foot’s old Doctrine of Doing and Allowing—the distinction, that is, between negative 
and positive duties, and the corollary that the former duties are much weightier.133  In the course 
of arguing for this conclusion, Thomson is compelled to dispense with one apparent counter-
example: the ‘common-sense’ verdict in the case of a bystander who must choose either to do 
nothing and allow five men to die, or to turn the trolley, thereby killing one. (Following tradition, 
we may call this case ‘Bystander’.)  Thomson now argues, following Alexander Friedman, that 
the common verdict is just wrong: we may not, in fact, take the second option and turn the trolley 
                                                 
131 “Doing Without Moral Theory,” p. 33; in Clarke and Simpson (eds.), Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral 
Conservatism. 
132 “Turning the Trolley,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Fall 2008. 
133 Foot helped revive the Doctrine in the contemporary casuistical literature, but the general idea—that negative 
duties are more stringent that positive ones—is of course traditional, and was noticed by nearly everyone.  (The 
name—‘The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing’—originates, I believe, in Quinn 1989.) Although I go on to disparage 
the use to which Thomson puts the principle, it is clear enough that the core of the idea is sound. 
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in such cases.  Then why, one will ask, does everyone think we may? Here Thomson suggests 
that our intuitions go awry in this case because we are “overly impressed by the fact that if [the 
bystander] proceeds, he will bring it about that more live by merely turning a trolley”134—that is, 
roughly, we are more easily able to ignore, here, the (morally relevant) fact that choosing the 
second option would violate our negative duty not to harm, only because the method by which 
harm is inflicted in this case is so bloodless and sanitized. 
The details of Thomson’s argument will not concern us further.  What I should like to 
explore in this paper, rather, is the general structure of the reasoning Thomson employs here, and 
the understanding of normative ethics and moral theory it, as I shall argue, implicitly 
presupposes.   
It will be useful to begin with an oddity in Thomson’s program already visible in the 
short précis above: Thomson writes (repeatedly) that her aim is to “explain” the verdicts we give 
in the various Trolley Problem permutations.  One might expect her rather to have tried to justify 
those verdicts.  In any event, she needs some contrast between her task with regard to these 
verdicts, and her task with regard to the aberrant verdict, sc., our ‘intuition’ (as we might say) 
that the bystander may turn the trolley.  That contrast comes out, ultimately, as one between 
explaining why we may do such-and-such, on the one hand, and explaining why it seems to us 
that we may do such-and-such else, on the other.135  The question then becomes: what 
substantiates this distinction? 
Before trying to answer this question, it is helpful to remind oneself that a distinction of 
roughly this shape is quite familiar to us: we are not yet enmeshed in controversial philosophical 
commitments when we say, for example, “It seemed all right to me then (to do such-and-such), 
                                                 
134 Ibid, p. 374; the emphasis has been added to retain the sense of the original sentence in context. 
135 “Turning the Trolley,” p. 374. 
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but I later realized that it was totally unjustified”; we are entirely familiar with a distinction 
between something’s being ‘all right’—justified, permissible, licit—and merely seeming to be all 
right.  Of course, if such a judgment is controverted, the pressure will be on to explain, not only 
the appearance (the ‘seeming’) but why our original moral verdict was a mere seeming—why 
what had originally seemed to justify the verdict now falls to the ground.  There are obviously 
many different cases here, and we shall return to them below; but the general pattern is clear 
enough. 
What is the analogue for Thomson? It is not, in fact, easy to say.  Indeed, read in 
isolation, Thomson’s explanation for the aberrant verdict might look very much like a 
justification.  Thus, in explaining why people tend to give the right verdict for certain other, 
morally symmetrical cases, but the wrong one to Bystander, she writes,  
The more drastic the means, the more strikingly abhorrent the agent’s proceeding. That, I 
suspect, may be due to the fact that the more drastic the means, the more striking it is that 
the agent who proceeds infringes a negative duty to the one.136 
But the thought here is evidently that, in Bystander, the morally relevant facts are less likely to 
strike us—where ‘striking’ connotes not a measure of wrongness but a psychological fact: 
‘strikingly’, in the first sentence, is meant, not as an intensifier (of ‘abhorrent’), but as an adverb 
of manner.  Our question is: what is the difference between the explanation offered here, for 
Bystander, and the other ‘explanation’, invoking the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA), for 
the rest of our verdicts? 
The question becomes more pressing in light of Thomson’s remark that the DDA itself 
requires “an account of its source.” Thus she writes: 
                                                 
136 Ibid. 
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[I]t is one thing to say there is a difference in weight between positive and negative 
duties, and quite another to say what the source of that difference is. I know of no 
thoroughly convincing account of its source, and regard the need for one as among the 
most pressing in all of moral theory.137 
Surely this need is pressing: absent such an account, we might feel entitled to ask why what has 
been ‘explained’ is on any different footing from what has been explained away.  That is: in both 
cases, we have a distinction available which explains why our verdicts vary systematically; but 
in the former case this distinction is supposed to carry moral weight, while in the latter, it is not.   
In a way, this is unfair to Thomson.  The language in which the explanation for our 
aberrant verdict is described is incompatible with a factive judgment: to be “overly impressed” 
by anything—here: the means of causing death—is to be impressed by it in a way that we 
oughtn’t be.  And indeed it may just seem obvious to us that the grisliness of the means by which 
someone’s death is brought about could not matter morally.  On the other hand, it seemed 
equally obvious to most of us that the bystander could indeed turn the trolley and kill the one.  Is 
there some sort of methodological principle to which we could appeal here which would tell us 
which sort of obviousness should ‘win’ (i.e., be morally decisive)?  One tempting answer to this 
question is that, absent a general principle that substantiates the particular verdict (‘intuition’), 
that verdict must be given up, no matter how ‘obvious’ it may appear.  But then, in the first 
place, it is none too clear that we have some general principle in the offing about ‘grisliness of 
means’.  Moreover, it is hard to see why some general principle should offer any support when 
that principle itself stands in need of justification (or “an account of its source”). 
                                                 
137 Ibid, p. 372. 
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The problem could be framed as follows: philosophers face a choice, in these situations, 
between giving up an ‘intuition’ about one case because it conflicts with a general principle 
(which principle, itself, has only its summarizing capacity and, perhaps, intuition, going for it); 
and searching for a new principle which covers all the cases.  Now on what basis might we 
decide to pursue one route over the other?138 
 
4. Shelly Kagan notes, in “Thinking About Cases,”139 that we give our intuitions about 
particular cases a kind of priority when doing philosophy: we are inclined to reject more general 
principles in favor of the more particular spontaneous verdicts that contradict them.  Kagan goes 
on to argue that this priority is mysterious.  For one thing, he writes, it is not really clear that we 
can draw a clean line between ‘specific’ intuitions, and those which we have about ‘general’ 
rules: though we tend to think of (e.g.) trolley problems as ‘specific’ or ‘concrete’, such 
hypotheticals are not, as Kagan notes, completely filled in.140 More important, we do not have a 
worked out moral epistemology which would enable us to say why more particular verdicts 
should be privileged. 
The point is important, since one ambition of moral theorizing has always been, as we 
have noted, to overturn particular verdicts by means of more general rules.  Yet we are very 
resistant to doing this in practice.  And this resistance, justified or not, stands in the way of the 
project’s ambition. 
                                                 
138 I am tempted to say here that Thomson’s method would be more acceptable if she had (honestly) begun with the 
intuition that we may not turn the trolley in Bystander, and then worked back to the DDA; but in fact she is quite 
explicit that she was forced (with everyone else) to give up her natural intuition about the case because it doesn’t fit 
the general rule which covers the rest of the cases.  It will be complained that these objections are, in the broad 
sense, ad hominem; but if the arguments below are sound, ad hominem objections are just the relevant kind. 
139 In Paul, Miller, and Paul, Moral Knowledge.   
140 Ibid, 60-3. 
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None of this is to say that we do, still less ought to, treat our specific moral intuitions are 
absolutely sacrosanct; and perhaps this is all a method like Thomson’s requires: one intuition, in 
particular, she regards as aberrant, a view to which she was led, apparently, by the fact that it 
cannot be covered by a general principle—the DDA—which covers all the other similar cases 
(that philosophers have yet dreamt up).  Of course, to hold that intuitions are not sacrosanct is 
not yet to violate our practice of giving a kind of priority to intuitions141: it is only to say that our 
intuitions are not infallible, and that much is demanded by any sane account, since different 
people have contradictory intuitions over a single case: it just can’t be that everyone’s intuitions 
are all correct.142  But there are different kinds of fallibility, and they are worth distinguishing.  
Thomson, in effect, treats intuitions as evidence; and that is not an unusual position to take—
Kagan himself uses this language repeatedly.  Evidence is of course defeasible, but when one 
concludes that some piece of prima facie evidence for some conclusion or other does not, in fact, 
support that conclusion, one has an obligation to explain the original appearance; Thomson is 
attempting to discharge this obligation when she tells her psychological story about why people 
tend to be cool with pulling the switch in Bystander.  But there are other ways to be wrong. 
Thomson’s program could be described as the floating of a moral hypothesis—and of 
course, she is far from alone in this; we might call it the standard method of first-order ethics.  
The moral hypothesis in question is the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing; and the evidence for 
this hypothesis consists in our various spontaneous moral judgments—our ‘intuitions’—about 
various hypothetical cases which are consistent with this Doctrine.  And just like in an ordinary 
                                                 
141 Though as Kagan notes, one counterexample of the specific-intuition type is usually regarded as sufficient for 
annihilating a theory (see ibid, p. 45).  Indeed, the construction of counterexamples to general principles might with 
equal justice be called the ‘main method’ of first-order ethics: see below in the text. 
142 In a way, this is too strong, since it would be possible to hold, e.g., that people only appear to disagree about 
various cases and that, should everyone be properly apprised of all the ‘descriptive facts’, everyone would agree; I 
myself sincerely doubt this to be the case, and regard it as a pious hope.  Alternatively, one might plump for some 
brand of subjectivism—equally unappealing.   
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case of hypothesis-confirmation, one must find some way to ‘account for’ the evidence that 
doesn’t fit: here, a psychological story about how we might be misled into making the aberrant 
judgment about Bystander. 
But is there something strange about the very idea of moral hypotheses—presupposing, 
as it does, the idea of a moral reality so alien to us that we have to make hypotheses about its 
nature?  One way to put our discomfort here (presuming to reader to share it) would be like this: 
for a putative moral rule to have any interest for us, it would have itself to strike us, intuitively, 
as correct, and this independently of any of its instances; otherwise, it is very hard to see why we 
should give up one of our spontaneous moral judgments (‘intuitions’) in favor of the rule.  Is the 
moral realm neat? Easily codifiable? Simple and elegant? It is hard to see just why anyone 
should think so.143 And if it is not, then it is hard to see why simplicity, elegance, and the like 
should count as merits in a rule that has nothing else going for it. –Which is not to say that the 
Doctrine of Doing and Allowing itself has no independent purchase on our moral sensibility; 
only to say that, if it does not, or if its only purchase comes by way of reflection on those 
intuitions that actually instantiate it, then it is hard to see why such a rule should compel us to 
suspend our judgment in Bystander.144 
The point can be brought out by considering an extreme form of a moral hypothesis:  
suppose that nine-tenths of our moral intuitions in some area could be accounted for by the Rule 
                                                 
143 There are some reasons, but I doubt their cogency: it might be suggested, e.g., that the moral realm must be 
simple enough for creatures like us to be able to understand it and make judgments about it; but in the first place, we 
seem to make judgments perfectly well—not to say ‘morally’, that would of course be begging the question; I mean: 
without difficulty—without the DDA.  Moreover, it’s hard to see why, on a view which countenances the very idea 
of moral hypotheses, anyone should suppose that the moral reality should be understandable by men at all; perhaps it 
is just too complicated for us, and we are doomed to forever getting it wrong.  Cf. Ch 3.  See also Bernard Williams 
1985, pp. 105-6 and 113 for similar doubts. 
144 And it is far from clear that Thomson regards DDA as intuitively compelling—she has, after all, resisted it for 
many years.  (Cf. fn. 138, above.) Moreover, her demand for “an account of its source” is plausibly read as a 
demand for a story that makes the DDA intuitive. (On the other hand, it may be, what is perhaps odd in its own way, 
a demand for a justification for something we already find intuitively compelling.) 
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of Open Doors: “Do that which maximizes the opening of doors.” I mean: suppose that, as it 
turns out, applying this rule in any particular case of action will give a verdict that is, nine-tenths 
of the time, in accord with our pre-theoretical moral intuition.  No one (I hope) would dream of 
supposing that we ought to overturn the remaining one-tenth of our moral judgments on the 
strength of this elegant rule.  The example is extreme, but the point is general: no mere inductive 
hypothesis which accounts for a good deal of the ‘data’ should convince us to throw out the 
remaining, ‘aberrant’ moral judgments—nor, I take it, by the same token, could it be thought to 
justify those intuitions with which it is consonant. 
The example may be thought a cheat, insofar as it imports our skepticism about our moral 
judgments ever being summarized by such a rule, into our intuitions about whether rules that are 
only as plausible as their instances might have some ‘normative force’ against aberrant (by the 
lights of the rule) judgments.  That is, if it strikes us as implausible that the Rule of Open Doors 
might ever have normative force against our moral intuitions, this (it may be argued) is only 
because it strikes us as implausible that this rule ever really could summarize (nine-tenths of) our 
moral judgments.  For this reason I am tempted to point to such rules as, “Do that which 
maximizes the propagation of your genes,” or “Do that which will result in the greatest happiness 
for the greatest possible number”; such rules probably do cover anyway a good deal of our 
ordinary moral intuitions; but unfortunately, people have gone so far as to actually believe these 
rules, so I suppose they will hardly help my case. 
What we need, in any event, is a closer investigation of the idea of moral hypotheses, and 
of the alternatives, with a view to answering this question: what sort of normative force—that is, 
force against our moral intuitions—might a general moral hypothesis have? 
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5. It seems to me there are two broad forms that a moral hypothesis might take.  One the one 
hand, if we decide to take quite seriously the analogy so often put forth between scientific 
theorizing and moral theorizing, we may think of the generation of moral hypotheses as, in 
effect, an exercise in curve fitting: our intuitions are the data points, the general principle 
describes the curve.  Such general moral rules could then turn out to be, upon their discovery, 
wholly novel or unthought of—at the extreme, the Rule of Open Doors.  On the other hand, one 
might suggest (as Kagan does) that the general rules are themselves familiar rules, which have 
some native intuitive force.  (I shall try to bring out the character of this second option more 
clearly in what follows.)   
Between these two poles, there are mixed options.  We might have, for example, a rule 
which, though relatively novel-sounding, has the backing of some larger metaphysical apparatus 
(our concept of ‘persons’, for example145).  But here too we can distinguish between rules which, 
absent the metaphysical structure, are basically unprepossessing, and on the other hand those 
rules which are already plausible, and for which the metaphysical apparatus is brought in just in 
order to ‘shore up’ the rule.  
We have then a kind of continuum, from rules which strike us as capturing some moral 
truth, to rules that seem to us no more attractive than the Rule of Open Doors: mere summaries, 
as we might say, of our reactions thus far.  My concern in this section is only with rules at the 
latter end of the spectrum.  These might indeed be called the pure form of a ‘moral hypothesis’.  
The question is why we should allow any such rule to overwrite a first-order intuition.  On the 
                                                 
145 Cf. F.M. Kamm 2007, p. 5; 1992, pp. 6-11.  Kamm is unusual among moral theorists, as she recognizes, in her 
reluctance to overwrite a first-order intuition; her view is that, in the face of intuitions which contradict some rule, 
we should simply make the rule more complicated, in order to account for that intuition.  By my lights, this is 
superior to the alternative.  But Kamm’s view that the discovery, and subsequent justification of, such general 
principles is necessary (see again 2007, p. 5), I find rather doubtful; I come to this point in §9. 
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face of it, it is hard to see what reason there could be; it would seem to amount to (what Smart in 
another context called) ‘rule-fetishism’.  If the point was to capture, in a general rule, the data of 
our first-order intuitions, then it would seem clear enough that any (robust) contradictory 
intuition simply falsifies the general principle; it will have to be junked, or emended.146   
It is sometimes said in this context147 that in discovering such rules, we are discovering 
facts about the ‘deep structure’ of our psychology, or principles which we “unconsciously” 
hold—i.e., some psychological mechanism.  The assumption, explicit or implicit, that there must 
be some such mechanism, is widespread.148 But whether or not any such mechanism ‘must’ be 
there, it would seem to be the grossest commission of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ to then suppose 
that we ought to overturn first-order intuitions which conflict with some (preliminary?) statement 
of the rule governing that mechanism.  That I tend to make judgments in ‘accordance’ with some 
general rule could not show, by itself, that I ought to make such judgments; still less could the 
fact that I usually make judgments in accordance with it mean that I should always do so. 
A propos of these remarks, we might also note (as I did above) the pervasiveness of the 
language of ‘evidence’ in connection with this mode of moral theorizing.149  Now the term 
‘evidence’ can be used in all sorts of ways, of course; but in common parlance, it is used to strike 
up a contrast between direct and indirect apprehension of some fact.150 This fits a picture on 
which our moral intuitions are regarded as indirect ways of coming to know general principles; 
given enough evidence, we are justified in ‘believing’ the general rule.  –That is, in believing 
                                                 
146 We could compare here the Unified Theory of Jokes.  Surely, if the goal is to discover the ‘rules’ governing what 
we find funny, a sound methodology will discard, or anyway amend, rules which have run into counter-examples. 
147 For instance, by Kamm, ibid, at fn.4, pp. 5 and 8. 
148 McKeever and Ridge 1996 are explicit: see pp. 147-8.  The antidote to such a view is found in McDowell 1979 
and 1981.  My own arguments against such a view are given in Chapter 3. 
149 Kagan, ibid, is typical. 
150 Cf. Austin’s “Other Minds,” reprinted in his 1961, on the contrast between “How do you know?” and “Why do 
you believe?”; he associates the latter with evidence, and that in turn with ‘indirect knowing’: see pp. 78-82. 
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that the general rule represents a genuine normative fact—albeit one that has been operating, as it 
were, behind our backs.151   
The burden of Chapter 1 was to argue that such a view leads to intolerable skeptical 
puzzles.152 I suggested there an alternative model for moral knowledge, one on which we only 
come to see that things are so in light of the reasons why they are so.  (And hence one where we 
query a claim by asking “Why?” rather than “How do you know?”) Such a model precludes the 
possibility of obtaining moral knowledge on the basis of evidence; and hence precludes moral 
hypotheses: the fact that many of our judgments are fit by some particular ‘general rule’ would 
go no way towards giving ‘evidence’ that such a rule was ‘true’.  If it were evidence for 
anything, it would be evidence that our judgments were the upshot of certain psychological 
mechanisms; or that they had their origin in (say) certain pressures from our evolutionary past—
hardly grounds for overturning new, recalcitrant first-order intuitions.   
Similar considerations were unearthed in the discussion of moral testimony (Chapter 2).  
My remarks there centered on the idea of thick moral concept possession; and I suggested that 
testimony was not guaranteed to transmit moral knowledge because it could not, by itself, 
guarantee the transmission of the relevant concept.  But the point might plausibly be broadened.  
My intermediate conclusion there was that ‘Humean grounds’—i.e., evidence, in my terms—
were not sufficient to generate spontaneous (moral) judgments.  In place of our aesthetic 
analogy, we might consider jokes again.  Could knowledge of just which jokes are funny be 
                                                 
151 I suppose it is idle speculation, but I have sometimes wondered whether the actual model for the method of moral 
hypothesis was not the investigations of natural science after all, but rather something more like the search for laws 
that have been promulgated by some legislator, and are only now dimly apprehended by us.  In that case we really 
could have something like a dispassionate investigation; the results of that investigation might surprise us; and we 
could get something like evidence that various laws were ‘in effect’.  Such a view of course raises familiar worries: 
we might wonder how the law ‘applies’ to us; or why we should ‘care about it’.    
152 For an argument that has some parallels to my own, see Setiya (nd); his concern is with skepticism stemming 
from considerations about disagreement.   
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passed on by testimony? Well, certainly I could tell someone which jokes were funny (supposing 
I knew)—and even ‘the reasons why’.  This might enable her to, e.g., tell someone else; or even: 
fake a laugh.  But if she is utterly humorless in general, then I think we shall say that all my 
testimony has not given her—as we could put it—‘comedic knowledge’: she will not be making 
any ‘spontaneous comedic judgments’.  
 By the same token, a method of moral hypothesis—or a Unified Theory of Jokes, for that 
matter—could not transmit any spontaneous moral judgments; and therefore it could not be a 
method of obtaining moral knowledge.  In each case, the reason is the same: the conclusions 
reached are reached on the basis of evidence, or ‘Humean’ grounds; and this falls short of 
producing the sort of ‘seeing that things are so in light of the reasons why’ that is necessary, if I 
am right, for genuine moral knowledge.  –Which is not to say, of course, that someone might not 
be set straight morally by being confronted with some general rules—or set straight by receiving 
some ‘testimony’.  But in each case, the Humean grounds—the evidence—will drop away as 
irrelevant: the fact that my interlocutor is sincere in asserting p; or that p fits a curve described by 
some general rule; these will play no part in my coming to see that p is so. 
 These points come out with more force if we could be allowed to suppose, what I did for 
dialectical purposes in Chapter 2, that moral knowledge is centrally a kind of conceptual 
knowledge or know-how, sc., knowledge of how to deploy various ‘thick’ moral terms.  What 
the method of moral hypothesis presupposes is that it is possible to learn that, e.g., some 
particular action is wrong, without coming to see that action as wrong.  In the present terms: it 
supposes that we could come to learn part of the extension of the concept of (e.g.) justice, 
without having achieved genuine mastery of that concept—without being able to apply it and 
reapply it in novel situations.  Like moral testimony, the method of hypothesis could only 
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generate a kind of counterfeit ‘knowledge’—the ability, at best, to fake someone else out on 
occasion, about the extent of our moral knowledge.    
 
6. But perhaps the idea of a ‘pure’ moral hypothesis had nothing going for it in the first place.  
After all, the general moral rules that are offered in these projects are always supposed to have 
some intuitive weight.153  The question—raised, e.g., by Kagan—is why we should give more 
weight to particular moral judgments than to these general rules which are, if not always 
familiar, anyway never as alien as the ‘Rule of Open Doors’. 
Before turning to that matter, however, I should like to begin by offering a sketchy and 
inevitably inadequate defense of the thesis that has come to be known as ‘judgment’ or 
‘motivational’ internalism.  This is the view, roughly, that there is some sort of necessary 
connection between any given moral judgment, and some motivation: someone who believes that 
it is wrong to Φ will be at least ‘partially motivated’ not to Φ—and so on.  
 The thesis remains extremely controversial;154 and I cannot hope to deal satisfactorily 
with it here.  But a few words on the topic are in order, and I should like to offer a mild defense. 
 In the first place, motivational internalism comes in many flavors; I mean only to assume, 
as I say, a very weak form of the thesis, namely: 
                                                 
153 It might be noted in this connection that the methods of moral theorizing are inevitably ‘dialectical’: it is a 
presupposition of such works that the reader shares the writer’s intuitions about the particular local cases deployed; 
the effort is always to move the reader from some things she believes to some other things—and not merely to retail 
alien facts, as we might find, e.g., in a treatise on chemistry. 
154 For a recent review of the literature, see Björklund, et al., 2012; they note that moral internalism is “one of the 
most debated theses in contemporary metaethics” (125).  The classic defense is probably Smith 1994, especially 71-
96 (he defends there a weak form of the thesis which he calls the ‘practicality requirement’).  Other defenders of 
motivational internalism are various as: Blackburn 1998 (see pp. 61-5); McDowell 1978, 1979; Stevenson 1937 (see 
p.16); and Price 1787 (especially at Ch. 8, p. 194).  Deniers of the thesis include Copp 1997 and Shafer-Landau 
2003. 
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WEAK MORAL INTERNALISM: if someone judges that she morally ought to Φ, then she is 
at least partially motivated to Φ, unless she is in special defeating circumstances. 
This formula is consistent with someone believing that she ought to Φ and yet, for all sorts of 
reasons, failing to do it: weakness of will, ‘depression’, etc.  It may even be consistent with some 
forms of the ‘amoralist’155 argument.   
 It will nevertheless be objected, as it has been repeatedly in the literature, that we can 
conceive without contradiction of someone—a complete amoralist—who has not now and never 
has had any motivation to act in any way morally, and yet for all that believes that various things 
are right and wrong.   
 I think it is worth noting here the striking parallel between this internalist/externalist 
debate, and the classic 20th century debate in the philosophy of mind over whether pain is 
intrinsically connected to ‘pain behavior’.  Here too, skeptics have offered images of stoics in 
great pain who nevertheless betrayed nothing; of whole races of ‘super-Spartans’ whose pain 
need never be displayed overtly; and all sorts of other thought experiments by which these 
theorists sought to sever the supposedly conceptual or anyway a priori tie between pain and its 
expression.   
 My own view is that these two strands of thought—skepticism about the connection 
between pain and pain behavior, and motivational externalism—contain a common error, 
namely, an inability to see how a connection can be both necessary and, at the same time, 
extremely elastic.156 This point can be brought out by considering a classic objection to the idea 
                                                 
155 For one of many versions of the amoralist argument against internalism, see Shafer-Landau 2003, p. 146ff. 
156 Blackburn 1998 emphasizes the importance of a ‘background’ of normal conditions—people being motivated by 
their moral judgments—against which we can make sense of the amoralist.  But the idea that, e.g., the ‘normal’ 
situations must outnumber the abnormal ones is probably a mistake.  Perhaps we need here some kind of ‘non-
Fregean generality’: see Thompson, 2008, especially the Introduction, and Part One, Chapter 4.    
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of moral internalism, when it is married to moral cognitivism.  “How,” it is asked, “could the 
mere belief that something ought to be done motivate one to do it?” This question is supposed to 
produce a dilemma: either we drop cognitivism, and allow that moral judgments are a kind of 
desire; or we drop motivational internalism, and allow that someone—anyone—can have some 
belief about what he ought to do without being moved to do it.   
 The objection tends to take on a metaphysical character: how could some belief-state 
have the property of being intrinsically motivating?  But surely the correct question is not about 
the properties of mental states, but about when we attribute moral beliefs to people.  And there is 
nothing mysterious in the idea that one criterion for the attribution of a moral belief to 
someone—some other or even, perhaps, oneself—is that she be partially motivated to act in 
compliance with it.  Here the familiar examples from the internalist literature come to mind: if 
someone consistently failed to do as she claimed that she ought, we would very commonly doubt 
either her sincerity, or her self-knowledge.  Indeed, without some such criterion, the idea of 
attributing moral ‘beliefs’ to people would seem to become something like pointless—anyway, 
would involve cutting the link between such beliefs and action.157   
And yet for all that, the connection between motivation and belief can, as I say, be very 
elastic: if in general someone tends to do as she says she ought; and moreover, this case is one 
that (say) only comes up when she is already placed in circumstances of great temptation; in such 
a case it would be possible to nevertheless credit her with the belief which she does not ever 
actually act on, but still avers.  What is important here, however, is that we have to suppose such 
                                                 
157 Cynically, then, one might say that moral philosophy had moved on from a concern with the moral agent, to a 
concern with the moral critic or judge, as Stuart Hampshire (1949, p. 467) once complained; and then from concern 
with the critic to concern with some kind of mere knower: moral knowledge as cut off from action and even from 
praise and censure. 
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things as that she is in a circumstance of great temptation.158 So that the question as to the truth 
of motivational internalism is not, I think, as has often been supposed, merely whether it is 
possible to imagine someone who believes she should Φ and yet does not; but also and at the 
same time what else we have to imagine in so imagining her.159   
These points will of course not be enough to persuade the determined externalist.  But I 
would emphasize here two points.  In the first place, and perhaps rather vulgarly, the fact that 
internalism still remains a live option means that, even if my points in what follows go through 
only for those of an internalist persuasion, something anyway will have been shown; and in the 
second, I am not sure that what I say below really does require a commitment to internalism.  For 
even externalists of all stripes largely believe that there is some kind of deep connection between 
moral judgments or beliefs and motivation; what they deny is only that it is a necessary 
connection; and it may be that a ‘deep’ connection is enough.160   
 
7. If Weak Motivational Internalism, or something like it, is true, it places a constraint on—
indeed, if what I have said above is correct, it is a constraint on—our attribution of moral beliefs 
to individuals; and this will have certain ramifications for moral hypotheses.  In particular, we 
could not attribute to someone a moral belief merely on the basis of her avowing it—indeed, not 
                                                 
158 Cf. Wittgenstein 1953, §391, on pain and pain behavior: “And it is important that I have to imagine an artful 
concealment here.” 
159 Parallel remarks might perhaps be made about the ‘complete’ amoralist, but I am not so sure.  My own 
inclination is to say that, insofar as I can imagine such a person, I imagine him to be either utterly insincere, or only 
voicing his moral ‘beliefs’ in a familiar, Harean, inverted-commas sense (see Hare 1952, §7.4).  On the other hand, 
it is very hard to know how much one’s intuitions have been damaged by theory; for some empirical evidence that 
non-philosophers are by and large externalists, see Shaun Nichols 2002.  For a kind of ‘attributionist’ internalist 
proposal in something like the same spirit as my own, see Jon Tresan, 2006. 
160 See e.g. Peter Railton 1986; and Sigrún Svavarsdóttir 1999.  Each admit as real, and thus try to give externalist 
explanations for, the deep connection between judging one ought to Φ and being motivated to Φ.  Additional support 
for something like motivational internalism might come from consideration pertaining to moral testimony: see 
Chapter 2 of the present work. 
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even on the basis of her sincerely avowing it; for she may just be wrong about what she thinks 
she believes, and that will be shown in her actions, and the moral judgments she makes about 
others, in cases real and hypothetical. 
 If something like this is right, then it is clear enough in the first place, I think, when we 
might attribute to someone (what we can call) a particular moral belief—e.g., that it would be 
wrong for her, now, to do this; or, slightly more generally, that it would be wrong for anyone, in 
such-and-such a situation, to do this.  Thus anyone who finds herself with the ‘intuition’ that one 
may not (say) push a fat man in front of a trolley to prevent the death of five others, evidently 
believes that it would be wrong to do so.  And then, if the foregoing was on the right track, we 
can say: it is correct to attribute to someone such a belief—sc., that it would be wrong to push 
the fat man—on the grounds that she is partially motivated by that belief.  Partially motivated 
how? Here, the motivation expresses itself in disapproval; hopefully, it would manifest itself in 
action by a refusal to push the fat man in a real situation.  And likewise for any other number of 
‘particular’ beliefs—beliefs, that is, about particular situations. 
 We can now ask when, on the other hand, we might correctly attribute to someone the 
belief in some general rule. 
 Here it will be useful to distinguish between two kinds of general rules—what we might 
call ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ rules.  ‘Thick’ rules will be those that employ some thick moral term, like 
‘honesty’ or ‘courage’; ‘thin’ moral rules, on the other hand, we can describe as ‘if-then’ 
statements, with some non-moral content on the left (say, ‘this is a lie’) and a thin term on the 
right (‘this is wrong’).  But either sort of rule could be compressed into a command or an ought-
statement: “Don’t lie,” say, or “One ought not to lie”—as opposed to “Be honest,” or “One ought 
to be honest.” It may be that these two rule-kinds mark out the ends of a continuum, as opposed 
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to flat alternatives, but then keeping the two poles in view will in any case be enough to orient 
us. 
 Now it is a notorious fact that very simple thin rules—like “It’s wrong to lie”—are 
inevitably inadequate.  Indeed it is just their inadequacy which has helped inspire the moral 
theorizing project, and its attempt to devise ever more elaborate rules which can capture our 
moral intuitions.  But it is an equally notorious fact that thick rules have struck many theorists as 
hopelessly vague—as insufficiently determinate to deliver the kind of answers we want from a 
moral theory.161  But one further, and related point to note about these rules is the differential 
ease with which we are able to attribute them to other people.   
 Thus suppose I (naively) attribute to Jones the rule “don’t lie”: I take it, on the basis of 
his conduct, that this is one of his moral rules.  Now if I should discover Jones generally telling 
lies in one sort of situation; or approving of them in thought experiments; and so on; then I shall 
have to emend the rule: “don’t lie—unless.” Whereas if I had begun by attributing to him the 
rule, “Be honest,” then such conduct need not undermine nor alter the attribution of this rule, but 
only alter my understanding of his application of the term ‘honesty’.   
 None of this is to say of course that, by applying the latter method, I shall find myself in 
more agreement with Jones than otherwise; it is only that the disagreements that we have, when 
we have them, will be located in a different place: we shall disagree, not over what the correct 
moral rule is, but over some of the applications of the concept ‘honesty’.   
                                                 
161 I suppose it might be argued that “Be honest” is as implausible a moral rule as “It’s wrong to lie”: should we 
really always be honest? There is a classic answer to this problem, which answer, however, exacerbates the other 
problem: on one understanding of the thesis of the unity of virtues, it is impossible to be honest and behave badly at 
the same time; thus where there is an apparent conflict between (say) honesty and kindness—such examples are easy 
enough to dream up—and the correct thing to do is (say) to be kind, then, this view tells us, in being kind we are not 
after all being dishonest.  And contrariwise, when honesty compels us to tell someone something that will hurt her, 
we are not being unkind in so telling her; indeed, in such a situation, it would be, not only dishonest, but no kindness 
to hide the truth.  Cf. McDowell 1979. 
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 What is interesting is that it appears that the same will be true of ascriptions of particular 
and general moral beliefs to myself.  I can discover my own particular moral beliefs by being 
confronted with (say) novel trolley cases: by eliciting my own moral intuitions.  And I can 
attribute general moral beliefs to myself on the basis of (say) the patterns of these responses.  
But, if the foregoing was sound, then it will be, in general, easier to attribute to myself—on the 
basis of my own conduct, and my patterns of approval and disapproval—certain ‘thick’ rules 
than their ‘thin’ counterparts.  –Or rather: the ‘thinner’ the rule, the more likely it will be that I 
shall later have to retract this self-ascription. 
 
8. Now Kagan considers the “deflationary” possibility162 that our deference to our intuitions 
about particular cases rests merely on the fact that we are more confident in them.  But if what I 
have written above is on the right track, then our deference to particular intuitions over more 
general ones rests not on our greater confidence that the former are true, but on our greater 
confidence, as we might put it, that we ourselves actually believe them.   
 There will no trouble, in general, with attributing to myself the belief in certain thick 
moral rules: such rules will not be contradicted by any new particular verdict; though I shall, in 
the course of discovering such verdicts, discover the contours of certain thick concepts of 
mine—honesty or kindness, say.   
But as we noted before, the relative ease with which one might attribute to himself belief 
in thick moral rules is the logical complement of the relative inability of such rules to override 
any particular judgment: new intuitions will, in general, neither contradict nor be contradicted by 
such rules.  Whereas it is just the opposite with the thin rules: they will more easily be found to 
                                                 
162 “Thinking about Cases,” p. 46. 
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contradict—or to be contradicted by—novel particular moral verdicts.  But the difficulty is, what 
I noted above, that since, in doing any bit of moral theorizing, we are always trying to figure out, 
not just the moral facts, but what we actually ourselves believe, every intuition which conflicts 
with the general thin rule will be so much evidence that we never did believe that rule in the first 
place.   
  
9. This explains, I think, and justifies, our reluctance to allow general moral rules (of the thin 
kind) to overwrite particular spontaneous moral verdicts.  But don’t we need some sort of 
justification, in the form of more general principles, or some kind of general metaphysical 
considerations? The point of Chapter 3 was to discourage such thoughts.  From the point of view 
of the present discussion, such principles would always come either too soon or too late—too 
soon, if they remained sufficiently un-vetted that they might overturn some centrally held 
spontaneous moral verdict (an intuition); too late, if questions at the ground level are already 
settled.  After all, it is well known that no such general principles will convince just anyone else; 
and they are after all superfluous for ourselves.163 
 What remains possible here, I think, is the hope of some kind of more profound self-
understanding that might be granted by the discovery of such principles.  Sometimes such things 
are said.  Here the details about the form of such general principles will matter.  But we can 
prescind from such details; the general idea will be a system of general principles which, 
although they will not be in the business of overturning any particular moral judgments, will 
                                                 
163 Hence I am profoundly suspicious that the idea of the “separateness of persons” is really fitted to do any work in 
moral theory; it is, rather, always tacked on at the end by anti-consequentialists, much too late to be taken seriously 
as the font of any anti-consequentialist intuitions; and much too soon to persuade any real consequentialists. 
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nevertheless explain or justify those judgments—perhaps the central ones—on which we all 
agree.  And then this would enhance our self-understanding. 
Perhaps.  But a very mild acquaintance with history will suffice to remind us that our 
ancestors—indeed, our grandparents—did not share a great deal of our moral judgments.  I take 
it as fairly obvious that our descendants—indeed, our grandchildren—will differ with us on a fair 
number more.  I suspect myself that they will regard us as barbarous and benighted.  I do not 
think these facts give us any reason to lose confidence in our own moral judgments.  But they 
surely make the project of erecting a superstructure atop—or, altering the metaphor, a foundation 
beneath—our own considered moral judgments (supposing even that ‘we’ all agreed on them) a 
bit silly: our descendents will reject that superstructure root and branch.  At best, they will regard 
it as rather quaint (as we perhaps regard certain intramural religious disputes of the last 
millennium); at worst, as a colossal waste of intellectual energy. 
On the other hand, these same descendants will be less likely to reject such a 
superstructure, the less it has to say about particular moral judgments.  At the limit, this 
‘superstructure’ will have no implications for first-order moral judgments.  Those who took the 
moral theorizing project seriously may now wonder what the point would be.  As far as their 
project goes, I think they would be right to wonder: this kind of investigation into the 
‘foundation’ of ethics would give no aid or comfort to the project of “a moral ‘theory’ which 
systematizes and extends a body of moral judgments.”  But it would be a mistake to simply reject 
such an investigation, on these grounds; after all, given the vague terms in which I have 
described it, to reject such a project might be to reject all (or almost all) meta-ethical 
theorizing—surely a mistake.    
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10. The implications of all this are serious.   
 In the first place, it would transpire that there is something seriously doubtful about 
advancing some general moral principle, when that principle conflicts with an intuition that one, 
oneself, has.  It cannot be right to say that the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing must be right, 
because it takes care of all known cases save one.  On the contrary, what Bystander shows us is 
that the DDA cannot be correct. 
 –Or rather, we have no special reason to believe that it is.  For all I have said here, 
Thomson may be right, and it may be that the ‘bloodlessness’ of the Bystander case is truly 
deforming our judgments.  But, if the foregoing is sound, she is not in a position to argue that we 
do wrong in turning the trolley in Bystander; she does not even believe it.  Only someone who 
saw turning the trolley in Bystander as wrong, in light of the reasons why, would be able to argue 
such a thing to us; otherwise, the supposition that it is wrong is really no more than a moral 
hypothesis. 
 None of this is to deny that we really could just decide to alter our behavior, and bring it 
in line with some principle unearthed in the course of moral theorizing.  Perhaps Professor 
Thomson will no longer flip switches in Bystander cases.  My thought is that this would be 
something like fraudulent—like forcing a laugh at jokes one doesn’t get, because the Theory 
says it’s funny; or proselytizing for films one doesn’t actually think are any good. 
 Nor could we deny that there is such a thing as authentically changing one’s mind in 
moral matters—and that, even, in the face of general moral principles.  It might be felt that 
without the help of theory, we are doomed to a sort of moral conservatism.164 But the fact is that 
there is such a thing as changing someone’s mind in ethical matters, without deploying the 
                                                 
164 See the various essays in Part II of Simpson and Clarke 1989. 
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sophisticated, evidential methods of moral theory.  Sometimes it is enough to remind someone of 
a general requirement of virtue.  Often, of course, it is not enough; but in such cases no amount 
of theory is going to help, either—that, at least, is my experience. 
 Relatedly, it has been argued, for example by Robert Louden,165 that moral theory—or 
“theory-like elements”—have been essential to moral progress.  It is an empirical question, I 
suppose; I rather doubt it—though in fairness I am less sanguine, maybe, that the ‘progress’ has 
been all in one direction.  But if we suspend our verdict on the last point; and moreover suppose 
that great moral change (one way or the other) really has been brought about by the deployment 
of “theory-like elements”; then one upshot of this essay is that such change may have been 
brought about by something like fraudulence.    
 For parallel reasons I am skeptical of the idea of deploying the results of moral theorizing 
to decide our actions in novel cases, or cases about which we have no real view.  It would be a 
method, I suppose; and, in the absence of any other, perhaps just as well.  But if the main lines of 
this essay are correct, it would amount to a more or less arbitrary way of deciding what to do; 
and would certainly not give us any moral knowledge.  A grand theory of film criticism might be 
similarly deployed to tell us about the relative merits of movies of which we have no strong 
opinion; but no one would think, I take it, that we might thereby discover ‘hidden’ masterpieces. 
But there are more general implications.  We are all familiar with a method, found not 
just in philosophy texts but in ordinary life, of trying to get our interlocutor to agree to some 
general moral principle; and then showing him, by means of that principle, that he must give up 
some first-order belief.  We are probably all equally familiar with the phenomenon in which our 
stubborn interlocutor, rather than admitting error, now simply denies that he subscribes to that 
                                                 
165 Louden 1992, pp. 149-50. 
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principle.  But if the foregoing is correct, then our interlocutor’s behavior is perfectly justified: 
we have exactly shown to him that he never really did believe in such a principle.  And it is we, 
in deploying such methods against him, who are engaged in sophistry.     
 
Pittsburgh, August 2012 
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